vowed on behalf of the deceased. There are two narrations regarding this. Delegation is not permissible in ritual purification, except for the pouring of water, the conveying of water [to the limbs] (19), and in the cleansing of impurity from the body, clothing, and other items.
Section: Everything in which agency is permissible, it is permissible for it to be fulfilled in the presence of the principal or in his absence. This was explicitly stated by Ahmad, and it is the school of Malik. Some of our companions said: It is not permissible to carry out the retaliation (qisas) and the punishment for slander (hadd al-qadhf) in the absence of the principal, and Ahmad gestured towards this. This is the position of Abu Hanifa and some of the Shafi'is, because it is possible that the principal might pardon [the offender] during his absence, causing the punishment to lapse; this possibility is a doubt (shubha) that prevents the carrying out of the punishment. Also, because pardoning is recommended, so if the principal were present, it is possible he might have mercy and pardon him. However, the first [view] is the manifest position of the school; because that which is permissible to carry out in the presence of the principal is also permissible in his absence, such as the hadd punishments and other rights, and the possibility of pardon is remote. The apparent [reality] is that if he had pardoned, he would have sent word and informed his agent of his pardon, and the default assumption is that he did not, so it has no effect. Do you not see that the judges of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) used to pass judgments in the lands and carry out the hadd punishments, which are repelled by doubts, despite the possibility of abrogation? Likewise, there is no requirement to be cautious in carrying out hadd punishments by bringing forward witnesses, despite the possibility of their retracting their testimony or a change in the judge's ijtihad.
Section: Agency is not valid except through offer and acceptance, because it is a contract to which the right of each of them is attached, so it requires offer and acceptance, like a sale. An offer is permissible with any word that indicates permission, such as commanding him to do something, or saying: "I have permitted you to do it." For the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) appointed 'Urwah ibn al-Ja'd as his agent to purchase a sheep using the wording of purchase (20), and Allah the Almighty said, informing us about the People of the Cave that they said: {So send one of you with this silver coin of yours to the city, and let him look which of them has the purest food, and let him bring you a provision from it} (21). And because it is a word indicating permission, it acts in the place of his saying: "I have appointed you." Acceptance is permissible with his saying: "I accepted," and any word that indicates it. It is also permissible by any action that indicates acceptance, such as
(19) In M: "lil-a'da'". (20) Its documentation was mentioned previously in 6/295. (21) Surah al-Kahf, 19.
المَنْذُورِ عن المَيِّتِ رِوَايَتانِ. ولا تَجوزُ الاسْتِنَابَةُ في الطَّهَارَةِ، إلَّا في صَبِّ الماءِ، وإِيصالِ الماءِ [إلى الأعْضاءِ] (١٩)، وفى تَطْهِيرِ النَّجَاسَةِ عن البَدَنِ والثَّوْبِ وغيرِهما.
فصل: وكلُّ ما جازَ التَّوْكِيلُ فيه، جازَ اسْتِيفَاؤُه في حَضْرَةِ المُوَكِّلِ وغَيْبَتِه. نَصَّ عليه أحمدُ. وهذا مذهبُ مالِكٍ. وقال بعضُ أصْحابِنَا: لا يجُوزُ اسْتِيفَاءُ القِصَاصِ وحَدِّ القَذْفِ في غَيْبَةِ المُوَكِّلِ. أَوْمَأَ إليه أحمدُ. وهو قولُ أبى حنيفةَ وبعضِ الشّافِعِيّةِ؛ لأنَّه يَحْتَمِلُ أن يَعْفُوَ المُوَكِّلُ في حَالَةِ غَيْبَتِه، فيَسْقُطَ؛ وهذا الاحْتِمالُ شُبْهَةٌ تَمْنَعُ الاسْتِيفاءَ. ولأنَّ العَفْوَ مَنْدُوبٌ إليه، فإذا حَضَرَ، احْتَمَلَ أن يَرْحَمَهُ فيَعْفُوَ. والأَوَّلُ ظَاهِرُ المذهبِ؛ لأنَّ ما جازَ اسْتِيفَاؤُه في حَضْرَةِ المُوَكِّلِ، جازَ في غَيْبَتِه، كالحُدُودِ وسائِرِ الحُقُوقِ، واحْتِمَالُ العَفْوِ بَعِيدٌ. والظاهِرُ أنَّه لو عَفَا لبَعَثَ وأعْلَمَ وَكِيلَه بِعَفْوِه، والأَصْلُ عَدَمُه، فلا يُؤَثِّرُ، ألا تَرَى أنَّ قُضاةَ رسولِ اللَّه -صلى اللَّه عليه وسلم- كانوا يَحْكُمُونَ في البِلَادِ، ويُقِيمُونَ الحُدُودَ التي تُدْرَأُ بالشُّبُهاتِ، مع احْتِمالِ النَّسْخِ؟ وكذلك لا يحْتَاطُ في اسْتِيفَاءِ الحُدُودِ بإِحْضَارِ الشُّهُودِ، مع احْتِمالِ رُجُوعِهِم عن الشَّهَادَةِ، أو تَغَيُّرِ اجْتِهادِ الحاكِمِ.
فصل: ولا تَصِحُّ الوَكَالَةُ إلَّا بالإِيجابِ والقَبُولِ؛ لأنَّه عَقْدٌ تَعَلَّقَ به حَقُّ كلِّ واحدٍ منهما، فافْتَقَرَ إلى الإِيجابِ والقَبُولِ، كالبَيْعِ. ويجوزُ الإِيجابُ بكلِّ لَفْظٍ دَلَّ على الإِذْنِ، نحو أن يَأْمُرَهُ بِفِعْلِ شيءٍ، أو يقولَ: أَذِنْتُ لك في فِعْلِه. فإنَّ النَّبِىَّ -صلى اللَّه عليه وسلم- وَكَّلَ عُرْوَةَ بن الجَعْدِ في شِرَاءِ شاةٍ بِلَفْظِ الشِّراءِ (٢٠)، وقال اللهُ تعالى، مُخْبرًا عن أهْلِ الكَهْفِ أنَّهم قالُوا: {فَابْعَثُوا أَحَدَكُمْ بِوَرِقِكُمْ هَذِهِ إِلَى الْمَدِينَةِ فَلْيَنْظُرْ أَيُّهَا أَزْكَى طَعَامًا فَلْيَأْتِكُمْ بِرِزْقٍ مِنْهُ} (٢١). ولأنَّه لَفْظٌ دَالٌّ على الإِذْنِ، فجَرَى مَجْرَى قولِه: وَكَّلْتُكَ. ويجوزُ القَبُولُ بِقَوْلِه: قَبِلْتُ. وكُلِّ لَفْظٍ دَلَّ عليه. ويجوزُ بكلِّ فِعْلٍ دَلَّ على القَبُولِ، نحو أن
(١٩) في م: "للأعضاء".(٢٠) تقدم تخريجه في: ٦/ ٢٩٥.(٢١) سورة الكهف ١٩.