what he forbade him from is not included in his permission. Thus, it is not permissible for him, just as if he had not appointed him.

Second: That he grants him permission to appoint an agent, in which case it is permissible for him; because it is a contract for which he granted him permission, so he may perform it, like the action he was permitted to perform. We know of no disagreement regarding these two cases. If he said to him, 'I have appointed you, so do whatever you wish,' he has the right to appoint an agent. The scholars of the Shafi'i school said: He does not have the right to appoint an agent in one of the two views, because 'appointment of an agent' (tawkil) implies an action he performs himself, and his statement, 'Do whatever you wish,' refers to what the appointment implies of his acting himself. Our argument is that his expression is general regarding whatever he wishes, so appointing an agent enters into its generality.

Third: That he leaves the agency unrestricted, which involves three categories: One of them is that the work is of a type that the agent would consider himself above, such as menial tasks in the view of the elite who are accustomed to being above performing them, or he is incapable of performing the task because he does not know how to do it, or for other reasons. In this case, it is permissible for him to appoint an agent; because if it is something the agent would not normally perform, the permission is interpreted as referring to what is customarily done by way of delegation. The second category is that it is something he would perform himself, but he is unable to perform it all due to its large quantity and scope. It is permissible for him to appoint an agent for its performance as well; because the agency implies the permissibility of appointing an agent, so it is permissible to appoint an agent to perform all of it, just as if he had granted permission to appoint an agent explicitly. The Qadi said: In my view, he only has the right to appoint an agent for what exceeds what he is capable of performing himself; because the appointment of an agent was only permitted out of necessity, so it is restricted to what necessity demands, unlike the existence of his explicit permission, for that is absolute. The scholars of the Shafi'i school have two views similar to these.