Section: If a man appoints an agent for litigation, his admission against his principal regarding the receipt of the right or otherwise is not accepted. Malik, al-Shafi'i, and Ibn Abi Layla held this view. Abu Hanifa and Muhammad said: His admission is accepted in the court session, excluding matters of hudud (fixed legal punishments) and qisas (retaliation). Abu Yusuf said: His admission is accepted both in and out of the court session, because an admission is one of the two responses to a legal claim, so it is valid from the agent, just like a denial. Our position is that an admission is a matter that terminates litigation and contradicts it, so the agent does not possess the right to perform it therein, just like a release from debt. It is distinguished from a denial, for a denial does not terminate the litigation, and he possesses the right to it in cases of hudud and qisas, and outside the judge's chamber. Furthermore, the agent does not possess the right to deny in a manner that prevents the principal from admitting; if he were to possess the right to admit, then the principal would be prevented from denying, so they are distinct. He does not possess the right to reconcile regarding the right, nor to grant a release from it, without any disagreement we are aware of, because permission for litigation does not necessitate any of that. If he grants him permission to establish a right, he does not possess the right to receive it. Al-Shafi'i held this view. Abu Hanifa said: He does possess the right to receive it, because the purpose of establishing it is to receive it and obtain it. Our position is that the receipt is not covered by the permission, neither verbally nor by custom, for not everyone whom one is pleased with for the establishment of a right is one pleased with for its receipt. If he appoints him to receive a right, and the one against whom the right is held denies it, he is an agent for its establishment against him, according to one of the two views. This is the view held by Abu Hanifa. The other view is: He does not have that right, and it is one of the two views of the followers of al-Shafi'i, because they are two different matters, so the agent in one of them is not an agent in the other, just as he is not an agent for receipt by virtue of appointment for litigation. The argument for the first view is that he cannot reach the receipt except by establishing the right, so it was permission for it by custom; and because receipt is not completed except by it, so he possesses it, just as if he appointed someone to buy a thing, he would possess the right to weigh its price, or to sell a thing, he would possess the right to deliver it. It is possible that if the principal was aware of the denial or stalling of the one against whom the right is held, it was an appointment for its establishment.