know of this, and I have been acting on his behalf," the agency is established. This is because the meaning of that statement is: "I have not known of it until now," and the acceptance of agency is permissible even if delayed. It is not a condition of the appointment that the agent be present or aware of it, so his ignorance of it does not cause harm. If he says, "I do not know the veracity of the two witnesses," his agency is not established, because he has cast doubt on their testimony. If he says, "I did not know," and remains silent, he is asked, "Explain." If he explains it by the first meaning, his agency is established; if he explains it by the second, it is not.

Section: It is valid to hear evidence concerning agency against an absent person, which is when one claims that a certain absent person appointed him for such-and-such. This is the view of al-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifa said: It is not valid, based on the principle that passing judgment against an absent person is not valid. Our view is that his consent is not considered in hearing evidence, so his presence is not considered, just as in other matters. If the person against whom the right is claimed says to him, "Swear that you are entitled to pursue my obligation," his claim is not heard, because that is an attack on the testimony. If he says, "The principal has dismissed you, so swear that he has not dismissed you," he is not made to swear, because the claim is against the principal, and oath-taking does not admit proxy. If he says, "You know that your principal has dismissed you," his claim is heard. If he requests an oath from the agent, the agent swears that he does not know that his principal has dismissed him, because the claim is against him. If the opponent produces evidence of dismissal, it is heard, and the agent is dismissed.

Section: The testimony of an agent against his principal is accepted due to the absence of suspicion, for he derives no benefit from it nor does he ward off any harm by it. His testimony for him is accepted in matters for which he was not appointed as an agent, because he does not derive any benefit for himself. His testimony for him is not accepted in matters for which he is an agent, because he is establishing a right for himself, as evidenced by the fact that if he were appointed to collect a right and then testified regarding it in his favor, his entitlement to collect it would be established, and also because he is an adversary in the matter, evidenced by the fact that he possesses the right of litigation regarding it. If he testifies regarding a matter for which he was an agent after his dismissal, it is also not accepted, whether he litigated the matter by virtue of the agency or not. This is the view of Abu Yusuf and Muhammad. Abu Hanifa said: If he did not litigate the matter, his testimony is accepted, because he has no right in it and did not litigate it, so it resembles a case where he was not an agent for it. Al-Shafi'i has two opinions corresponding to these two schools of thought. Our view is that by the contract of agency, he became a party to the dispute regarding it, so his testimony is not accepted, just as if he had litigated it, and it differs from a case where he was not an agent, for in that case, he was not a party to the dispute.