liability by cause, just as if he were to dig a well, and a person's slave came and threw himself into it. Our argument is that it departed due to his act, so the liability is incumbent upon him, just as if he had startled it, or it departed immediately after his opening and untying it. Direct action only occurred from that which it is impossible to attribute the legal ruling to, so it falls away, just as if he were to startle a bird, or agitate a beast, or urge (43) a dog onto a boy, killing him, or set fire to a person's goods; for the fire has an effect, but since it is impossible to attribute the legal ruling to it, its presence is as its absence. Furthermore, it is the nature of a bird and other game to be skittish, and it only remains in place due to a barrier; so when the barrier is removed, it departs by its nature. Thus, its liability rests upon the one who removed the barrier, like one who cuts the attachment of a lantern, so it falls and breaks. The same applies if he unties the shackle of a slave and he departs, or a captive and he escapes. If he opens the cage and unties the horse, and they remain standing, then another person comes and startles them, and they depart, the liability is upon the one who startled them, because his cause is more specific, so the liability is exclusive to him, like the pusher (dafi') alongside the digger (hafir). If a person's bird lands on a wall and a person startles it, and it flies away, he is not liable for it, because his startling it was not the cause of its loss, for it was already unrestrained before that. If he shoots and kills it, he is liable for it, even if it was in his house, because it was possible for him to startle it away without killing it. Likewise, if the bird passes through the air space of his house and he shoots and kills it, he is liable for it, because he does not have the right to prevent the bird from the air space of his house (44); it is as if he had shot it in the air space of someone else's house.

Section: If one unties a waterskin containing liquid, and it pours out, he is liable for it, regardless of whether it spills immediately, or trickles out little by little, or something comes out of it that wets its bottom and it collapses, or it weights one of its sides and it keeps tilting little by little until it falls, or it falls due to wind, or an earthquake, or it was solid and melted by the sun, because it perished due to his act. The Qadi said: He is not liable if it falls due to wind or earthquake, but he is liable in other cases, which is the position of the companions of al-Shafi'i. They have two views regarding if it melts by the sun, arguing that his act was not the compelling cause, and the subsequent occurrence is a direct action, so liability does not attach (45) to his act, just as if a person were to push it. Our argument is that his act is the cause of its destruction, and nothing occurred between them to which the legal ruling could be attributed, so liability is binding upon him, just as if it had come out immediately after his act, or tilted little by little, and as if he had wounded a person and the heat or cold affected him, causing the wound to spread, for he is liable. As for if a person pushed it, there is a direct action intervening between them that is capable of being attributed, unlike our issue. If it was solid and another person brought fire near it, causing it to melt and flow, the liability is upon the one who melted it, because his cause is more specific since the destruction follows it immediately, so it is like the one who startles a beast versus the one who opens a cage. Some Shafi'is said: There is no liability upon either of them, like two thieves, one of whom breaks in and the other takes out (46) the goods. This is invalid, because the one who brought the fire near forced it to flow, so he is liable for it, just as if it were standing and he pushed it. The issue itself is an argument against him, for the liability is upon the one who removes the goods from the secure place (hirz), and the amputation (for theft) is a legal punishment (47) that is not obligatory except by both breaking the hirz [and taking the property] (48), and then, the legal punishment is averted by doubts, unlike civil liability. If one of them melted it first, then the second opened its top and it poured out, the liability is upon the second, because the destruction followed his act. If he opens a waterskin that is upright, and some of what is in it comes out, and it continues to trickle out little by little, then another comes and tips it over and it pours out, the liability for what came out after the tipping is upon the one who tipped it, and for what was before it, upon the opener; because the act of the second is more specific, like the one who wounds and the one who slaughters.