by his act, just as if a person were to push it. Our argument is that his act is the cause of its destruction, and nothing occurred between them to which the legal ruling could be attributed, so liability is binding upon him, just as if it had come out immediately after his act, or tilted little by little, and as if he had wounded a person and the heat or cold affected him, causing the wound to spread, for he is liable. As for if a person pushed it, there is a direct action intervening between them that is capable of being attributed, unlike our issue. If it was solid and another person brought fire near it, causing it to melt and flow, the liability is upon the one who melted it, because his cause is more specific since the destruction follows it immediately, so it is like the one who startles a beast versus the one who opens a cage. Some Shafi'is said: There is no liability upon either of them, like two thieves, one of whom breaks in and the other takes out (46) the goods. This is invalid, because the one who brought the fire near forced it to flow, so he is liable for it, just as if it were standing and he pushed it. The issue itself is an argument against him, for the liability is upon the one who removes the goods from the secure place (hirz), and the amputation is a legal punishment (47) that is not obligatory except by both breaking the hirz [and taking the property] (48) together, and then, the legal punishment is averted by doubts, unlike civil liability. If one of them melted it first, then the second opened its top and it poured out, the liability is upon the second, because the destruction followed his act. If he opens a waterskin that is upright, and some of what is in it comes out, and it continues to trickle out little by little, then another comes and tips it over and it pours out, the liability for what came out after the tipping is upon the one who tipped it, and for what was before it, upon the opener; because the act of the second is more specific, like the one who wounds and the one who slaughters.

Section: If one unties the binding of a ship and it departs or sinks, he is liable for its value, whether this followed his act immediately or after a delay. The disagreement regarding it is like the disagreement regarding the bird in the cage.

Section: If a person lights a fire on his own property, or in wasteland, and a spark flies to his neighbor's house and burns it, or he waters his land and the water flows onto his neighbor's land and floods it, he is not liable if he did what is customary without negligence, because he is not a transgressor, and because it is the spreading of a permissible act, so he is not liable,