After the greeting: "May Allah bless you in the deal you have made," or if he prayed for his forgiveness or similar, his right of preemption is not void, because this is connected to the greeting and is considered part of it. Invoking a blessing for him regarding the deal is an invocation for himself, as the share of property will return to him; therefore, this does not constitute consent. If he engages in other speech or remains silent without necessity, his right of preemption is void, for the reasons we previously mentioned.

Section: If one who is an informant tells him of the sale, and he believes him but does not demand the preemption, his right of preemption is void, regardless of whether the informant is someone whose report is accepted or not, because knowledge may be obtained through the report of one whose report is not accepted, due to indications pointing to his truthfulness. If he says, "I did not believe him," and the informant is someone whose testimony is legally valid, such as two upright men, his right of preemption is void, because their statement is a proof by which rights are established. If he is someone whose statement is not acted upon, such as a libertine or a child, his right of preemption is not void. It is narrated from Abu Yusuf that it does lapse, because it is a report that is acted upon in the Sharia, such as in granting permission to enter a house and similar matters, so the right of preemption lapses through it, like the report of an upright person. Our position is that it is a report that is not accepted in the Sharia, so it is like the statement of a child or an insane person. If an upright man or a person of unknown status informs him, his right of preemption lapses. It is also possible that it does not lapse. This is narrated from Abu Hanifah and Zufar, because the testimony of a single person is not sufficient. Our position is that it is a report in which testimony is not required, so it is accepted from an upright person, just like transmission of hadith, legal opinion (fatwa), and other religious reports. It differs from testimony, as testimony is strictly safeguarded by its wording, the setting (majlis), the presence of the defendant, and his denial, and because testimony is countered by the denial of the denier and imposes a right upon him, unlike this report. Regarding this, a woman is like a man, and a slave is like a free man. The Qadi said: They are like the libertine and the child. This is the school of al-Shafi'i, because no right is established by their statement. Our position is that this is a report and not testimony, so a man and a woman, and a slave and a free man are equal in it, like the transmission of hadith and religious reports. A slave is among those qualified for testimony in matters other than fixed penalties (hudud) and retaliation (qisas), and this is among those, so he is like the free man.

Section: If the buyer represents that the price is higher than the price at which the contract was actually concluded, and the preemptor leaves the preemption, the preemption does not lapse by that. This is the view of al-Shafi'i, the scholars of opinion (ahl al-ra'y), and Malik.