the distance of the journey, going and returning; because his excuse for failing to make the demand is evident, so he does not need witnesses alongside it. We have already mentioned the aspects of al-Khiraqi’s statement. There is no disagreement that if he is unable to have witnesses testify during his journey, his right of preemption does not lapse; because he is excused for failing to do so, so it is like if he left the demand due to an excuse or due to a lack of knowledge. Whenever he is able to have witnesses testify but delays it, it is like the delay of the demand for preemption; if it was due to an excuse, the right of preemption does not lapse, and if it was without an excuse, it lapses; because having witnesses testify stands in the place of the demand and acts as a deputy for it, so what is considered for the demand is considered for it. Anyone who is unable to have anyone testify except those whose testimony is not accepted—such as a minor, a woman, or an immoral person—and leaves having witnesses testify, his right of preemption does not lapse by his failing to do so; because their word is not considered, so it is not obligatory for him to have them testify, just like children and the insane. If he does not find anyone to have testify except someone who will not arrive with him to the place of the demand, and he does not have them testify, then the preferred view is that his right of preemption does not become void; because having them testify is of no benefit, so it is like having someone testify whose testimony is not accepted. If he does not find anyone except those of hidden character and does not have them testify, it is possible that his right of preemption becomes void; because their testimony can be established through verification (tazkiyah), so they are like two upright witnesses. It is also possible that it does not become void; because he requires great difficulty to establish their testimony, and he may be unable to do so, so their testimony would not be accepted. Even if he does have them testify, his right of preemption does not become void, regardless of whether their testimony is accepted or not; because he could not do more than that, so he is like one unable to have witnesses testify. The same applies if he is unable to have anyone testify except for one person, and he either has him testify or leaves having him testify.

Section: If he has witnesses testify to the demand, then delays his arrival despite being able to, the manifest implication of al-Khiraqi’s words is that the right of preemption remains in its state. Al-Qadi said: His right of preemption becomes void. If he is unable to travel, but is able to appoint an agent to demand it, yet does not do so, it also becomes void; because he is one who has abandoned the demand despite his ability to do so, so it lapses, just like the one who is present, or as if he had not had witnesses testify. This is the school of al-Shafi'i, except that they have two perspectives regarding the case where he is able to appoint an agent but does not; one of which is that his right of preemption does not lapse, because he has an interest in demanding it himself, due to his being more capable of doing so, or because he fears harm from the side of his agent, such as the agent acknowledging a bribe against him or similar matters, thus he would be bound by his acknowledgment, so he is excused. We hold that he faces harm in traveling due to undertaking its burden, and he may have needs and trade that would be interrupted and lost due to his absence. If the appointment of an agent is for a fee, a debt is incurred, and if it is without a fee, he is under an obligation of gratitude. He also fears harm from his side, so having witnesses testify is sufficient. As for if he leaves traveling due to his inability to do so, or due to harm that would reach him in it, his right of preemption does not become void by unanimous agreement; because he is excused, so he is like one who did not know.