confessing its purchase for him, preemption is not established regarding it unless it is proven by evidence, or the absent person returns and the child reaches the age of puberty, at which point he [the preemptor] demands it from them. This is because ownership is established for them by his confession of it, so his confession of the purchase after that is a confession regarding another person's property, and is thus not accepted. This is unlike the case when he confesses the purchase at the outset, because ownership is established for them by that [initial] confession which establishes the preemption, so both are established. If he does not mention the cause of ownership, the judge does not ask him about it, nor is he required to clarify it, because if he were to explicitly state the purchase, preemption would not be established by it, so there is no benefit in investigating it. The school of Al-Shafi'i in this entire section is the same as our school.

Section: If there is a house between a person present and an absent person, and the one present claims against the person in whose hand the share of the absent person is that he bought it from him, and that he is entitled to it via preemption, and he [the possessor] confirms this for him, then the preemptor may take it via preemption, because the person in whose hand the physical asset is, is believed regarding his disposition of what is in his hands. This is the view of Abu Hanifa and his companions. Al-Shafi'i's companions have two views on this: the first is that he may not take it, because this is a confession against another. Our argument is that he confessed concerning what is in his hand, so his confession is accepted, just as if he confessed to his original ownership. Similarly, if he claimed against him: "You sold the share of the absent person with his permission," and the agent confessed it for him, it is like the seller's confession of the sale. If the absent person arrives and denies the sale, or the permission to sell, then his word is taken with his oath, he recovers the share, and may demand its rent from whomever he chooses between them, while the liability settles upon the preemptor, because the usufructs perished under his hand. If he demands it from the agent, he [the agent] has recourse against the preemptor; if he demands it from the preemptor, he has no recourse against anyone. If he claims against the agent: "You bought the share that is in your hand," and he denies it, saying: "I am only an agent for it, or a trustee for it," then his word is taken with his oath. If the claimant has evidence, judgment is passed accordingly. This is the view of Abu Hanifa and Al-Shafi'i, even though Abu Hanifa does not see the validity of a judgment against an absent person, because the judgment here is against the present person regarding the obligation of preemption upon him and the entitlement to extract...