or one of them forgives the other, and the other does not forgive, then for the one who is not forgiven there is a quarter and a sixth, and the remainder is between the two who forgave in halves, with each of them having a sixth and an eighth, and the problem is correctly resolved from twenty-four. The issues derived from this are according to the course of what we have mentioned.

885 - Issue: He said: "And there is no preemption for a disbeliever against a Muslim."

The summary of this is that if the Dhimmi's partner sells a share to a Muslim, there is no preemption for him against him. This is narrated from al-Hasan and al-Sha'bi. It is also narrated from Shurayh and Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz that he does have the right of preemption. This is also the position of al-Nakha'i, Iyas ibn Mu'awiyah, Hammad ibn Abi Sulayman, al-Thawri, Malik, al-Shafi'i, al-'Anbari, and the People of Opinion (Ashab al-Ra'y). This is based on the general import of his saying (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him): "It is not lawful for him to sell until he seeks the permission of his partner, and if he sells it without seeking his permission, he is more entitled to it." And because it is an option established to ward off harm through purchase; therefore, the Muslim and the disbeliever are equal in it, like returning due to a defect. Our evidence is what al-Daraqutni narrated in his book "al-'Ilal" with his chain of narration from Anas, that the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said: "There is no preemption for a Christian." This specifies the general import of what they used as evidence. Also, because it is a right of ownership that follows from the existence of specific property, it is not obligatory for the Dhimmi against the Muslim, like Zakat. Moreover, it is a right specific to real estate, so it resembles the right of elevation in construction. This is confirmed by the fact that preemption was only established for the Muslim to ward off harm from his property, so warding off his harm was prioritized over warding off the harm of the purchaser, and it does not follow from prioritizing warding off the harm of the Muslim against a Muslim that one must prioritize warding off the harm of the Dhimmi, for the right of the Muslim is weightier and his preservation is more worthy. Furthermore, the establishment of preemption in the area of consensus, contrary to the principle, is out of consideration for the right of the Muslim partner, and the Dhimmi is not in the same status as the Muslim, so he remains upon the requirements of the principle. Preemption is established for the Muslim against a Dhimmi due to the generality of the obligating evidences, and because if it is established for a Muslim against a Muslim, despite his great sanctity and the consideration of his right, then it is more fitting and appropriate that it be established against a Dhimmi despite his lowliness.