two sureties for his companion; because the suretyship is regarding his person, not what is in his liability. Whichever of the two sureties brings the person whose body is guaranteed is absolved, and his companion is absolved from the suretyship; because he is a branch of him, but he is not absolved from bringing the person whose body is guaranteed; because he is a principal in that. If the person whose body is guaranteed acts as a surety for the surety, it is not permissible; because he is a principal to him in the suretyship, so it is not permissible for him to become a branch to him in what he acted as a surety for. If he acts as a surety for him in other than this right, it is permissible; because he is not a branch to him in that.

824 - Issue: He said: (Whenever he performs it, he has recourse against him, whether he said to him: "Guarantee on my behalf," or he did not say it.)

Meaning, if he performs the debt intending to have recourse against the person whose liability is guaranteed. As for if he pays off the debt as a volunteer, not intending to have recourse for it, then he does not have recourse for anything; because he has volunteered with that, resembling charity. It is the same whether he guaranteed it by his command or without his command. As for if he performs it with the intention of having recourse, this does not exclude four conditions: First, that he guarantees by the command of the person whose liability is guaranteed, and performs it by his command; then he has recourse against him, whether he said to him: "Guarantee on my behalf," or "Pay on my behalf," or he was absolute (in his request). This is the opinion of Malik, al-Shafi'i, and Abu Yusuf. Abu Hanifa and Muhammad said: If he said: "Guarantee on my behalf and pay on my behalf," he has recourse against him. And if he said: "Pay this," he does not have recourse, unless he is an associate of his, who borrows from him and leaves deposits with him; because his saying: "Guarantee on my behalf and pay on my behalf," is an admission from him of the right. And if he is absolute with that, it becomes as if he said: "Give this to him, or volunteer for him." And if he is an associate of his, he has recourse as a matter of judicial preference (istihsan); because he may order his associate to pay on his behalf. Our position is that he guaranteed and paid by his command, so it is like when he is an associate of his, or he said: "Guarantee on my behalf." What they mentioned is not correct; because if he orders him to guarantee, it is only for what is against him, and his order to pay after that reverts to what he guaranteed, by the evidence of the one who is his associate, so it is obligatory upon him to pay what he performed on his behalf, as if he had expressly stated it. The second condition: He guaranteed by his command, and paid without his command, he has the right to recourse as well. This is also the opinion of Malik and al-Shafi'i in one of the accounts from him. The second account: He does not