in length, and the garment remains as he desired, while that is not possible in width. As for if he produced it short in length and width, or in one of them, there are also two views: One is that he has no wage, and he is liable for the shortage of the yarn; because he violated what he was ordered to do, so it resembles one who is hired to build a wall one cubit wide, but builds it half a cubit wide. The second is that he is entitled to a portion of the named wage, like one hired to mold bricks, but who only molds some of them. It is possible that if he produced it short in width, he receives nothing, whereas if it is short in length, he is entitled to a portion of the named wage, due to the difference we mentioned between length and width. If he produced it with an excess in one and a shortage in the other, he has no wage for the excess, and for the shortage, it follows the details we mentioned. Muhammad ibn al-Hasan said regarding both cases: The owner of the garment is given the choice between handing the garment to the weaver and demanding the price of his yarn, or taking it and paying him the named wage for the excess, or a portion for the woven part in the case of a shortage; because his purpose was not fulfilled, as he benefits from the long what he does not benefit from with the short, and he benefits from the short what he does not benefit from with the long, so it is as if he ruined his yarn. Our argument is that he found the substance of his property, so he does not have the right to demand compensation for it, just as if he had produced it with an excess in length alone. However, if the excess or shortage impacts the original intent—such as if he ordered him to weave ten cubits so the garment would be light, but he wove fifteen, so it became dense, or he ordered him to weave fifteen so it would be dense, but he wove ten, so it became light—then he has no wage in any case, and he is liable for the shortage of the yarn, because he did not bring anything of what he was ordered.

Section: If he hands a garment to a tailor and says, "If it can be cut into a shirt, then cut it," and he says, "It can be cut," and he cuts it but it is insufficient, he is liable for it. If he says, "Look, will this suffice me for a shirt?" and he says, "Yes." He says, "Cut it." He cuts it but it does not suffice, he is not liable. This is the position of al-Shafi'i and the scholars of opinion (Ashab al-Ra'y). Abu Thawr said: There is no liability on him in either case; because if he had deceived him in the first, he would have deceived him in the second. Our argument is that in the first case, he only permitted him to do so on the condition of its sufficiency, so he cut it without meeting the condition; whereas in the second, he permitted him to do so without a condition, so they differ. Liability was not imposed in the first case due to his deception, but rather for the lack of permission to cut it, because his permission was restricted by the condition of its sufficiency, and thus it does not count as permission for anything other than what the condition was met for, unlike the second case.