the first, he would have deceived him in the second. Our argument is that he only permitted him in the first case on the condition of its sufficiency, so he cut it without meeting its condition; whereas in the second, he permitted him to do so without a condition, so they differ. Liability was not imposed in the first case due to his deception, but rather for the lack of permission to cut it; because his permission was restricted by the condition of its sufficiency, and thus it does not count as permission for anything other than what the condition was met for, unlike the second case.

Section: If he ordered him to cut the garment into a man's shirt, but he cut it into a woman's shirt, he is liable for the difference between its value when intact and when cut; because this is a cut for which there was no permission, so it resembles one who cut it without permission. It is said: He is liable for the difference between a woman's shirt and a man's shirt; because he was permitted to make a shirt in general. The first view is more correct; because the permitted object is a shirt described with a specific quality. When he cut a different shirt, he was not performing what he was permitted to do, so he was a transgressor from the beginning of the cutting. For that reason, he is not entitled to any wage for the cutting, whereas if he had performed what he was ordered to do, he would have been entitled to his wage.

Section: If they disagree, and the owner says: "I permitted you to cut it into a man's shirt," while the tailor says: "Rather, you permitted me to cut it into a woman's shirt." Or if he says: "I permitted you to cut it into a shirt," and the other says: "Rather, into a qaba' (a type of long coat)." Or if the dyer says: "You ordered me to dye it red," and the owner says: "Rather, black." The statement is that of the tailor and the dyer. Ahmad explicitly stated this in the narration of Ibn Mansur. This is also the position of Ibn Abi Layla. Malik, Abu Hanifa, and Abu Thawr said: The statement is that of the owner of the garment. The scholars of the Shafi'i school disagreed; some said there are two views for him, like the two schools of thought. Others said there is a third view, which is that they should swear oaths against each other, like two transacting parties who disagree on the price. Others said the correct view is that the statement is that of the owner of the garment; because they disagreed on the nature of his permission, and his statement is accepted regarding the existence of the permission itself, so the same applies to its nature. Also, because the default is the absence of the disputed permission, so the statement is that of the one who denies it. Our argument is that they