in every circumstance; because it results from the action of the child, so it proceeds in the same manner as the substance resulting from his action, unlike weight gain, as it is possible that it belongs to the father, so it would not prevent retraction, because it is the growth of the substance, so it would be a follower to it. If he gifted him a pregnant animal and it gave birth while in the possession of the child, it is an inseparable increase in the offspring. It is possible that the offspring is a separable increase if we say: Pregnancy has no legal standing. If he gifted him a pregnant animal, then retracted it while it was still pregnant, it is permissible if its value has not increased; but if its value has increased, it is an inseparable increase. If he gifted him a non-pregnant animal and it became pregnant, it is a separable increase, and he has the right to retract it without its pregnancy. If we say: The pregnancy has no legal standing, and its value increased because of it, it is an inseparable increase. If its value did not increase, it is permissible to retract it. If he gifted him a palm tree and it became pregnant (pollinated), it is an inseparable increase before pollination, and a separable increase after it.

Section: If part of the substance is destroyed, or its value decreases, it does not prevent retraction of it, nor is there any liability upon the child for what was destroyed of it; because it is destroyed while in his ownership. This applies whether it was destroyed by the action of the child or otherwise. If the slave committed a crime for which a penalty (arsh) is attached to his person, it is like his decrease due to the loss of some of his parts, and the father has the right to retract it. If he retracts it, he bears the penalty of the crime. If the slave is a victim of a crime, and the father retracts him, the penalty for the crime belongs to the child; because it is equivalent to a separable increase. If it is said: If the father wanted to retract a pledged item (rahn), and it is subject to redemption, he cannot do so; how then can he retract a slave who has committed a crime if he has paid the penalty for his crime? We say: The pledge prevents disposal of the substance, unlike the crime. Also, because redeeming a pledge is a rescission of a contract that the recipient had entered into, whereas here, the right did not attach to him by way of a contract, so they differ.

Section: Retracting a gift is by saying: "I have retracted it," or "I have taken it back," or "I have revoked it," or similar terms indicating retraction, and it does not require a judge's ruling. Al-Shafi'i held this view. Abu Hanifah said: Retraction is not valid except through a judge's ruling; because the ownership of the recipient is established. To us, it is an option in the rescission of a contract, so it does not depend on a judgment, like rescission based on an option of condition. As for if he takes back what he gifted to his child, if he intended by it a retraction, it is a retraction, and his word is accepted regarding his intention. If it is not known whether he intended retraction or not, and this happened after the father's death, then if no evidence is found indicating retraction, it is not judged to be a retraction; because taking it back could be for retraction or otherwise, and we do not remove a certain ruling by a doubtful matter. If there are accompanying indications pointing to the retraction, there are two opinions: One is that it is a retraction, which was chosen by Ibn 'Aqil; because we were satisfied in the contract with the indication of the situation, so in rescission, it is even more appropriate, and because the word of retraction is only a retraction due to its indication of it, so everything that indicates it is the same. The other is that it is not a retraction, which is the school of al-Shafi'i; because ownership is certainly established for the recipient, so it does not cease except by an explicit statement. It is possible that this can be based on the contract itself; so whoever makes the offer and acceptance mandatory in it, does not consider here anything sufficient except a word that necessitates its cessation, and whoever considers in the contract the exchange (mu'atah) indicating consent to be sufficient, it is even more appropriate here. If he intended the retraction without action or word, the retraction does not occur, according to a single opinion; because it is the establishment of ownership over property owned by another, so it does not occur by mere intention, like other contracts. If he conditioned the retraction, such as saying: "When the beginning of the month arrives, I have retracted the gift," it is not valid; because the rescission of the contract does not depend on a condition, just as the contract does not depend on it.