it is accepted. This is the opinion of the proponents of Ra’y (Reasoning), because his state is unknown, and he has confessed to servitude, so it is accepted, just as if two men arrived from the Abode of War (Dar al-Harb) and one of them confessed to the servitude of the other. It is also like if he confessed to a retaliation (qisas) or a prescribed punishment (hadd); it is accepted even if that entails the loss of his own life. It is possible that it is not accepted, and this is the correct view, because the right of Allah Almighty regarding the freedom that has been legally established is invalidated by it, so it is not valid, just as if he had previously confessed to his freedom. Furthermore, his freedom has been legally established, so his confession to servitude is not accepted, as we have mentioned, and because the abandoned child does not know his own servitude nor his freedom. No new condition has occurred to him by which he would know his own servitude, because in that earlier state he was someone who did not possess intellect, and no servitude was newly acquired after he was found, so his confession is void. This is the opinion of al-Qasim and Ibn al-Mundhir. Regarding the Shafi'i school, there are two positions as we have mentioned. If we say: his confession is accepted, his legal rulings become the rulings of slaves regarding what is against him, but not what is for him. This was stated by Abu Hanifa and al-Muzani, and it is one of the two statements of the Shafi'i school, because he has confessed to something that necessitates a right for him and a right against him, so it is required that it establishes what is against him, but not what is for him, just as if he said: 'I owe so-and-so a thousand dirhams, and I have a pledge with him.' It is also possible that his confession is accepted in its entirety. This is the second statement of the Shafi'i school, because if what is against him is established, then what is for him is established, just like evidence. Also, these rulings are consequential to servitude, so if the principle is established by his statement, the consequence is established, just as if a woman testified to a birth; the birth is established, and lineage is established as a consequence of it. As for if he confesses to servitude initially to a man, and he confirms it, it is as if he confessed to it in response. But if he denies it, his confession is void. Then, if he confesses to it after that to another man, it is permissible. Some of our companions said: It is appropriate that his second confession not be heard, because his first confession entailed an acknowledgement of the negation of any master for him other than this one to whom he confessed. So, when his confession was voided by the rejection of the one to whom he confessed, the acknowledgement of the negation of any master for him other than him remained, so his confession to what he had negated is not accepted, just as if he had confessed to freedom and then later confessed to servitude. Our argument is that it is a confession which the one to whom he confessed did not accept, so it does not prevent him from confessing a second time, just as if he had confessed to a garment belonging to him, and then confessed it for another after the first one rejected it. This differs from a confession to freedom, for his confession to freedom was not voided and not rejected.