future, and this contains harm to the husband. We say: Her statement was not accepted in establishing a right that was not included in the contract itself. As for the ruling in the future, it is possible to fulfill her right and the right of the one to whom her servitude was established by him divorcing her, so that which he did not enter into remains unbinding upon him, or he may remain in his marriage with her, in which case the right of her master does not lapse. If he divorces her, she shall observe the waiting period ('iddah) of a free woman, because the waiting period of divorce is a right belonging to the husband, as evidenced by the fact that it only becomes obligatory upon consummation, and its cause is the previous marriage; thus, her statement regarding its reduction is not accepted. If he dies, she shall observe the waiting period of a slave woman, because the element that prevails therein is the right of Allah the Exalted, as evidenced by its obligation before consummation; therefore, her statement regarding it is accepted. As for the one who says that her statement is accepted in all legal rulings, this is a slave woman who married without the permission of her master, so her marriage is void, and they shall be separated. If this is before consummation, she has no dowry. If he has consummated the marriage with her, there is due to her the dowry of a slave woman who was married without the permission of her master, according to what has been mentioned in its proper place. And is that the customary dowry (mahr al-mithl) or the specified dowry? There are two narrations regarding this. She shall observe a waiting period of two menstrual cycles, because it is intercourse within a void marriage, and her children are free, due to his belief in her freedom, for he is deceived regarding her freedom, and he is liable for their value on the day of delivery. If he dies leaving her behind, the waiting period for death is not obligatory.

Section: If he has engaged in transactions of sale or purchase, his transaction is valid, and the rights and prices incumbent upon him are fulfilled from what is in his possession, and whatever remains is a liability upon him, because the one transacting with him does not acknowledge his state of servitude. The one who says that his confession is accepted in all legal rulings asserts the invalidity of all his contracts, and mandates the return of the specific items to their owners if they remain; if they are destroyed, their value becomes a liability on his person, if we hold the position that what a slave borrows without his master's permission is a liability on his person. If we hold that the borrowing of a slave is a liability upon his general debt (dhimma), then this is likewise, and he is pursued for it after emancipation, because the consent of his owner has been established.

Section: If he has committed an offense necessitating legal retaliation (qisas), then the law of retaliation applies to him, whether the victim was a free person or a slave; because his confession of servitude necessitates the obligation of retaliation upon him in the case where the victim is a slave or a free person, so his confession is accepted in that regard. If the offense was by error, its indemnity (arsh) attaches to his person, because that is harmful to him. If its indemnity is greater than his value, and he has wealth in his possession, it shall be satisfied from it; and if it is of the type that the paternal relatives (aqila) bear, his statement is not accepted in dropping the excess, because that harms the victim, so his statement is not accepted regarding it. It was said: The excess becomes obligatory upon the public treasury (bayt al-mal), because it was a right owed to the victim, so his statement is not accepted in dropping it. If an offense was committed against him necessitating retaliation, and the perpetrator was free, it lapses; because a free person is not subjected to retaliation for a slave, and he has confessed to the victim that which causes the retaliation to lapse. If it was an offense requiring payment that decreases with servitude, the lesser of the two matters becomes obligatory. If it was equal to the obligation before the confession, it becomes obligatory, and he pays the obligation to his master. If the obligation is greater because his value as a slave is more than his blood money (diya) as a free person, then only the indemnity of the offense against a free person becomes obligatory. The one who accepts his statement in all legal rulings mandates the indemnity of the offense against the slave. If the indemnity is borne by the paternal relatives when he is free, it falls away from the paternal relatives and does not become obligatory upon the perpetrator; because his confession of servitude entails his confession of its removal from the paternal relatives, and it was not accepted in obligating it upon the perpetrator, so it lapsed. It was said: It does not shift away from the paternal relatives. And the one who says: His confession is not accepted in all legal rulings, mandates the indemnity upon the perpetrator.