such as making a lump sum contract for the harvesting of a specific crop. It is permissible to hire a man to water his crops, clean them, thresh them, and transport them to a specific location. It is permissible to hire a man to collect firewood for him; because it is a permissible act in which substitution is allowed, similar to harvesting crops. Ahmad said, regarding a man who hired an employee to collect firewood for him with two donkeys every day, and the man would transport firewood on them and on the donkeys of another person, and take a fee for it: If any harm comes to the employer, he shall hold him liable for the value. The apparent meaning of this is that the employer holds the employee liable for the value of what he lost by his preoccupation away from his work; for he said: If any harm comes to him, he holds him liable for the value. He thus considered the harm. The apparent meaning is that if he did not suffer harm, he is not entitled to anything; for he hired him for a task, and he fulfilled it completely, so nothing is owed by him, just as if he hired him for a task, and he was reading the Quran during his work, if it harmed the employer, he would hold him liable for the value of what he made him lose. It is possible that he meant he holds him liable for the value of what he performed for someone else; because he diverted his labor, which was the subject of the contract, to the work of someone other than the employer, so he owes its value, as if he had performed it for himself. Al-Qadi said: Its meaning is that he holds him liable for the fee he took from the other person, because his labor during this period is owned by someone else, so whatever is obtained in exchange for it belongs to the one who hired him.

Section: It is permissible to hire for the implementation of retaliation (qisas), both in cases of life and lesser injuries. Malik, al-Shafi'i, and Abu Thawr also held this view. Abu Hanifah said: It is not permissible in cases of life; because the number of strikes varies, and the location of the strikes is not fixed, as it is possible to strike from what is near the head or from what is near the shoulder, so it is unknown. Our argument is that it is a right for which agency is permissible in its implementation, and its performer is not uniquely defined as one who must be an agent of worship, so hiring for it is permissible, as is the case for retaliation in limbs. His saying that the number of strikes varies and is unknown is invalidated by the sewing of a garment, as the number of stitches is unknown. And his saying that its location is not fixed—we say: It is approximate, so that does not prevent its validity, just like the location of sewing on the hem of a garment. The fee is the responsibility of the one against whom retaliation is taken. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i and Abu Thawr. Abu Hanifah and Malik said: It is the responsibility of the one who implements it, because it is not fixed, and the one against whom retaliation is taken has no duty except to make himself available, just as if he purchased the fruit of his palm trees. Our argument is that it is a fee that becomes due for the fulfillment of a right, so it is the responsibility of the one who is fulfilling it, like the fee for a weigh-master or a measurer. What they mentioned is incorrect; for the cutting is owed by him, unlike the fruit, as evidenced by the fact that if he made himself available for the cutting and he did not cut, and someone else cut it, the right of the owner of the retaliation does not lapse. If availability were equivalent to delivery, his right would have lapsed, as in the case of fruit.