and earnings, they belong to the heirs. According to the other view, they belong to the legatee. If he bequeathed a slave woman to her husband, and she bore him a child after the death of the testator and before acceptance (14), her child is a slave belonging to the heir. According to the other view, he is free-born and there is no wala’ (patronage) upon him, and his mother is an umm walad (mother of a child); because she conceived him from a free man while in his [the heir's] ownership. If the legatee dies before acceptance or rejection, his heir may accept it. If he accepts it, he acquires ownership of the slave woman and her child, and if he is someone upon whom the child would be emancipated, he becomes free, and he [the heir] does not inherit anything from his son. According to the other view, the slave woman becomes an umm walad, and the son inherits from his father; if he impedes the accepting heir, he impedes him. Most of the Shafi’i companions said: The son does not inherit anything here; because inheriting him would prevent the statement of the acceptor from being an heir, thus his acceptance would be void, leading to circularity (al-dawr) and to the invalidation of his inheritance, so it resembles the case where an heir acknowledges someone who excludes him from the inheritance. We have already mentioned in the chapter on acknowledgement (al-iqrar) what refutes this, and that the acknowledged person inherits, so it is the same here. The acceptance of one who is an heir at the time the acceptance is considered is counted, just as in acknowledgement, the acknowledgement of one who is an heir at the time of acknowledgement is counted. And Allah knows best. Among these is that if he bequeathed his father to a man, and the legatee died before acceptance, and then his [the legatee's] son accepted, it is valid, and the grandfather is emancipated upon him, and he does not inherit anything from his son; because his freedom only occurred at the time of acceptance after the inheritance had already gone to someone else. According to the other view, his freedom is established from the time of the testator's death, so he inherits one-sixth from his son. Some Shafi’i companions said: He does not inherit either; because if he were to inherit, his acceptance would have to be considered, and it is not permissible to consider his acceptance before the ruling of his freedom, and if considering it is not permissible, he is not emancipated, which leads to his inheritance resulting in the invalidation of his inheritance. This is fallacious; for if all the heirs acknowledge a participant with them in the inheritance, his lineage is established and he inherits, even though the acknowledgers cease to be the sole heirs. Among these is that if the legatee died and his heir accepted, ownership would be established for the accepting heir initially from the side of the testator, not from the side of his deceased relative, and nothing would be established for the legatee; therefore, his debts are not paid, his bequests are not executed, and those upon whom he would have emancipated are not emancipated. However, if among them there are those upon whom the heir would emancipate, they are emancipated upon him, and his wala’ (patronage) belongs to him, not to the legatee. According to the other view, it is evident that ownership was established
(14) In the original and A: "his acceptance".
والكَسْبِ، فهو لِلْوَرَثةِ. وعلى الوَجْهِ الآخَرِ، يكونُ لِلْمُوصَى له. ولو أوْصَى بأمَةٍ لِزَوْجِها، فأوْلَدَها بعد مَوْتِ المُوصِى، وقبلَ القَبُولِ (١٤)، فوَلَدُه رَقِيقٌ للوارِثِ. وعلى الوَجْهِ الآخَر، يكونُ حُرَّ الأَصْلِ، ولا وَلَاءَ عليه، وأُمُّه أُمُّ وَلَدٍ؛ لأنَّها عَلِقَتْ منه بِحُرٍّ في مِلْكِه. وإن ماتَ المُوصَى له قبلَ القَبُولِ والرَّدِّ، فلِوَارِثِه قَبُولُها، فإن قَبِلَها، مَلَكَ الجارِيَةَ ووَلَدَها، وإن كان ممَّن يَعْتِقُ الوَلَدُ عليه عَتَقَ، ولم يَرِثْ من ابْنِه شَيْئًا. وعلى الوَجْهِ الآخَر، تكونُ الجارِيَةُ أُمَّ وَلَدٍ، ويَرِثُ الوَلَدُ أباه، فإن كان يَحْجُبُ الوارِثَ القابِلَ حَجَبَه. وقال أكْثَرُ أصْحابِ الشافِعِىِّ: لا يَرِثُ الوَلَدُ ههُنا شَيْئًا؛ لأنَّ تَوْرِيثَه يَمْنَعُ قولَ القابِلِ وارِثًا، فيَبْطُلُ قَبُولُه، فيُفْضِى إلى الدَّوْرِ، وإلى إبْطالِ مِيرَاثِه، فأشْبَهَ ما لو أقَرَّ الوارِثُ بمَن يَحْجُبُه عن المِيرَاثِ. وقد ذَكَرْنا في الإِقْرارِ ما يَدْفَعُ هذا، وأنَّ المُقرَّ به يَرِثُ، فكذا ههُنا. ويُعْتَبَرُ قَبُولُ مَنْ هو وارِثٌ في حالِ اعْتِبارِ القَبُولِ، كما يُعْتَبَرُ في الإِقْرارِ إقْرَارُ مَنْ هو وارِثٌ حالَ الإِقْرارِ. واللهُ أعلمُ. ومن ذلك، لو أَوْصَى لِرَجُلٍ بأَبِيه، فماتَ المُوصَى له قبلَ القَبولِ، فقَبِلَ ابْنُه، صَحَّ، وعَتَقَ عليه الجَدُّ، ولم يَرِثْ من ابْنِه شَيْئًا؛ لأنَّ حُرِّيَّتَه إنما حَدَثَتْ حين القَبُولِ بعدَ أن صارَ المِيراثُ لغيرِه. وعلى الوَجْهِ الآخَر، تَثْبُتُ حُرِّيَّتُه من حينِ مَوْتِ المُوصِى، فيَرِثُ من ابْنِه السُّدُسَ. وقال بعضُ أصْحابِ الشافِعِىِّ: لا يَرِثُ أيضًا؛ لأنَّه لو وَرِثَ لَاعْتُبِرَ قَبُولُه، ولا يجوزُ اعْتِبارُ قَبُولِه قبلَ الحُكْمِ بِحُرِّيَّتِه، وإذا لم يَجُزِ اعْتِبارُه، لم يَعْتِقْ، فيُؤَدِّى تَورِيثُه إلى إبْطالِ تَوْرِيثِه. وهذا فاسِدٌ؛ فإنَّه لو أقَرَّ جَمِيعُ الوَرَثةِ بمُشَارِكٍ لهم في المِيرَاثِ، ثَبَتَ نَسَبُه ووَرِثَ، مع أنَّه يَخْرُجُ المُقِرُّونَ به عن كَوْنِهم جَميعَ الوَرَثةِ. ومن ذلك، أنَّه لو ماتَ المُوصَى له، فقَبِلَ وارِثُه، لَثَبَتَ المِلْكُ للوارِثِ القابِلِ ابْتِداءً من جِهَةِ المُوصِى، لا من جِهَةِ مَوْرُرثِه، ولم يَثْبُتْ لِلْمُوصَى له شيءٌ، فحينئذٍ لا تُقْضَى دُيُونُه، ولا تَنْفُذُ وَصَاياهُ، ولا يَعْتِقُ مَن يَعْتِقُ عليه، وإن كان فيهم مَن يَعْتِقُ على الوارِثِ، عَتَقَ عليه، وكان وَلَاؤُه له دُونَ المُوصَى له. وعلى الوَجْهِ الآخَر، يَتَبَيَّنُ أنَّ المِلْكَ كان ثابِتًا
(١٤) في الأصل، أ: "قبولها".