it is impossible to estimate its duration, for it is only contracted for eternity. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifah said: If the child reaches puberty, he has the option [to rescind], because he contracted for his benefits at a time when he did not possess the capacity to dispose of himself. Once he possesses that capacity, the option is established for him, like a slave woman when she is manumitted while under a husband. We respond that it is a binding contract, concluded for him before he possessed the capacity to dispose of himself; once he possesses it, the option is not established for him, like the father marrying off his son. As for what they drew a parallel with, the option is only established for her when she is manumitted while under a slave due to a defect, not for the reason he mentioned. For this reason, if she were manumitted while under a free man, the option would not be established for her. If the guardian who leased the child or his property dies, or is removed from office, and the guardianship passes to another, his contract does not become void. This is because he disposed of it while being a person authorized to act, within the scope of his guardianship, so his action is not invalidated by his death or removal, just as if the overseer of an endowment (waqf) died or was removed, or if a judge died after having ruled on matters within his jurisdiction. This is distinct from a case where a beneficiary of an endowment (mawquf 'alayh) leases the endowment for a period and then dies during it; for he leased the property of another without his permission, during a period in which he has no guardianship. Here, however, the second guardian only possesses the guardianship [in the disposal] of what the first did not dispose of; and since the first has already disposed of this contract, no guardianship over what it covers is established for the second.

Section: If one leases his slave for a period, and then emancipates him during it, the manumission is valid, and the lease contract is not voided, according to the analogical reasoning (qiyas) of the school. The slave does not have recourse against his master for anything. This is the later of al-Shafi'i's two opinions. In the earlier opinion, he said: He has recourse against his master for the fair rental value (ajr al-mithl); because the benefits are being extracted from him due to a cause that originated from the master, so he has recourse against him for it, just as if he coerced him after his manumission to perform that work. We respond that it is a benefit entitled by the contract before the manumission, so he does not have recourse for its equivalent, just as if he had married off his slave woman and then manumitted her after the husband had consummated the marriage with her; for what the master extracts, he does not have recourse for against him. This differs from the coerced person, for the master acted wrongfully in that instance. Abu Hanifah said: The slave has the option to rescind or uphold the contract, like the child when he reaches puberty, for the same reason he mentioned there. We respond that it is a binding contract, which he concluded regarding what he owns, so it is not voided by manumission, nor does his ownership of it cease, just as if he had married off his slave woman and then sold her.