it owns, so it is not voided by manumission, nor does his ownership of it cease, just as if he had married off his slave woman and then sold her. Once this is established, the maintenance of the slave, if it was stipulated to be upon the lessee, remains upon him as it was. If it was not stipulated upon him, it is the responsibility of the manumitter, because he is like one remaining in his ownership, evidenced by the fact that he owns the compensation for his benefit, and because the slave is unable to provide for his own maintenance, as he is occupied with the lease, nor is the lessee responsible for it, as he has become entitled to his benefit for a compensation other than his maintenance. Thus, it remains that it is the responsibility of the master.
Section: If one leases an object and then sells it, the sale is valid, as explicitly stated by Ahmad, whether he sells it to the lessee or to someone else. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i in one of his two views. In the other, he said: If he sells it to someone other than the lessee, the sale is not valid, because the hand of the lessee is intervening, preventing delivery to the purchaser, and thus it prevents validity, just as in the sale of usurped property. We respond that the lease is a contract over benefits, so it does not prevent validity, just as if he had married off his slave woman and then sold her. Their statement that "the hand of the lessee is intervening against delivery" is incorrect, because the hand of the lessee is only over the benefits, while the sale is over the substance (raqaba); the establishment of possession over one does not prevent the delivery of the other, just as if he sold a married slave woman. Even if it were to prevent delivery immediately, it would not prevent it at the time when delivery is mandatory, which is upon the expiration of the lease; and capacity to deliver at that time is sufficient, as in the case of a forward sale (salam). Abu Hanifah said: The sale is contingent upon the approval of the lessee; if he approves, it is valid and the lease is voided, and if he rejects it, it is void. We respond that the sale is over something other than that which is the subject of the lease, so his approval is not considered, like the sale of a married slave woman. Once this is established, the purchaser owns the sold object deprived of the benefit until the expiration of the lease, and he is not entitled to the delivery of the object until then, because the delivery of the object is only sought for the sake of extracting its benefit, and its benefit is only deserved when the lease expires. This becomes equivalent to one who buys an object in a distant place; he is not entitled to its delivery until after the passing of a period sufficient for it to be brought, like one who makes a forward contract to a time when he is not entitled to receive the subject of the forward sale until its time. If the purchaser does not know of the lease, he has the option between rescinding and upholding the sale for the full price, because that is a defect and a deficiency.
(21) Omitted from: B. (22) Omitted from: The original.
ما يَمْلِكُه، فلا يَنْفَسِخُ بالعِتْقِ، ولا يَزُولُ مِلْكُه عنه، كما لو زَوَّجَ أَمَتَه ثم باعَها. إذا ثَبَتَ هذا، فإنَّ نَفَقَةَ العَبْدِ إن كانت مَشْرُوطةً على المُسْتَأْجِرِ، فهى عليه كما كانتْ، وإن لم تكنْ مَشْرُوطةً عليه (٢١)، فهى على مُعْتِقِه؛ لأنَّه (٢٢) كالباقِى على مِلْكِه، بِدَلِيلِ أنَّه يَمْلِكُ عِوَضَ نَفْعِه، ولأنَّ العَبْدَ لا يَقْدِرُ على نَفَقَةِ نَفْسِه؛ لأنَّه مَشْغُولٌ بالإِجَارةِ، ولا على المُسْتَأْجِرِ؛ لأنَّه اسْتَحَقَّ مَنْفَعَتَهُ بعِوَضٍ غيرِ نَفَقَتِه، لم يَبْقَ إلَّا أنَّها على المَوْلَى.
فصل: إذا أجَرَ عَيْنًا، ثم باعَها، صَحَّ البَيْعُ، نَصَّ عليه أحمدُ، سواءٌ باعَها لِلْمُسْتَأْجِرِ أو لغيرِه. وبهذا قال الشافِعِيُّ، في أحَدِ قَوْلَيْه، وقال في الآخَرِ: إن باعَها لغير المُسْتَأْجِرِ، لم يَصِحَّ البَيْعُ؛ لأنَّ يَدَ المُسْتَأْجِرِ حائِلةٌ تَمْنَعُ التَّسْلِيمَ إلى المُشْتَرِى، فمَنَعَتِ الصِّحَّةَ، كما في بَيْعِ المَغْصُوبِ. ولَنا، أنَّ الإِجارةَ عَقْدٌ على المَنافِعِ، فلم تَمْنَعِ الصِّحَّةَ، كما لو زَوَّجَ أَمَتَه، ثم باعَها. وقولُهم: يَدُ المُسْتَأْجِرِ حائِلَةٌ دُونَ التَّسْلِيمِ. لا يَصِحُّ؛ لأنَّ يَدَ المُسْتَأْجِرِ إنَّما هي على المَنافِعِ، والبَيْعَ على الرَّقَبةِ، فلا يَمْنَعُ ثُبُوتُ اليَدِ على أحَدِهما تَسْلِيمَ الآخَر، كما لو باعَ الأمَةَ المُزَوّجَةَ، ولئِن مَنَعَتِ التَّسْلِيمَ في الحالِ، فلا تَمْنَعُ في الوَقْتِ الذي يَجِبُ التَّسْلِيمُ فيه، وهو عند انْقِضَاءِ الإِجَارةِ، ويَكْفِى القُدْرَةُ على التَّسْلِيمِ حينئذٍ، كالمُسْلَمِ فيه. وقال أبو حنيفةَ: البَيْعُ مَوْقُوفٌ على إجَازَةِ المُسْتَأْجِرِ فإن أجَازَهُ جازَ، وبَطَلَتِ الإِجَارَةُ، وإن رَدَّهُ بَطَلَ. ولَنا، أنَّ البَيْعَ على غيرِ المَعْقُودِ عليه في الإِجَارةِ، فلم تُعْتَبَرْ إجازَتُه، كبَيْعِ الأَمَةِ المُزَوَّجَةِ. إذا ثَبَتَ هذا، فإنَّ المُشْتَرِىَ يَمْلِكُ المَبِيعَ مَسْلُوبَ المَنْفَعةِ إلى حينِ انْقِضَاءِ الإِجَارَةِ، ولا يَسْتَحِقُّ تَسْلِيمَ العَيْنِ إلَّا حينئذٍ؛ لأنَّ تَسْلِيمَ العَيْنِ إنَّما يُرَادُ لِاسْتِيفاءِ نَفْعِها، ونَفْعُها إنَّما يَسْتَحِقُّه إذا انْقَضَتِ الإِجَارةُ، فيَصِيرُ هذا بِمَنْزِلةِ مَن اشْتَرَى عَيْنًا في مكانٍ بَعِيدٍ، فإنَّه لا يَسْتَحِقُّ تَسْلِيمَها إلَّا بعدَ مُضِىِّ مُدَّةٍ يُمْكِنُ إحْضَارُها فيها. كالمُسْلِمِ إلى وَقْتٍ لا يَسْتَحِقُّ تَسَلُّمَ المُسْلَمِ فيه إلَّا في وَقْتِه، فإن لم يَعْلَمِ المُشْتَرِى
(٢١) سقط من: ب.(٢٢) سقط من: الأصل.