the first is a bequest to him, and there is no bequest for an heir. He has now become an heir along with his brother, so he inherits half the value of his own person and half the value of his brother. His brother inherits the remainder. His brother, the one gifted, was a gift to him from the terminally ill person, so he is emancipated by virtue of his kinship to him, and he was not emancipated by the terminally ill person; thus, his emancipation was not a bequest, but rather he consumed it through the emancipation that took place regarding it. Therefore, the first one is liable to his brother for half of his value and half of the value of his brother. As for the opinion of Abu Hanifah, if the deceased left no heir other than them, they both become free, and the first is liable to his brother for half the value of his brother, but he is not liable to him for half the value of himself; because if he left no heir, his bequest is valid, since they do not inherit, and they are not emancipated until the bequest of the first is valid; because whenever there is a remainder of striving (siyayah) upon him, neither of them inherits, and neither is emancipated. It is necessary that he executes for the emancipated one a bequest so that he may become free, then his brother becomes emancipated by his emancipation, and the bequest has become valid for him in his entire person; because when the deceased leaves no heir, his bequest is valid in his entire wealth. They both inherit, and the second has recourse against the first for half of his value; because he says: "I and you have become heirs, so do not take anything from the inheritance without me, and my person was a bequest to you and was emancipated by you, so guarantee for me half of my person." If he is insolvent and there is wealth other than the two of them, the second takes half of it, then takes from the second half half the value of himself, and what remains is inheritance for his first brother.

Section: If the terminally ill person has three thousand and he donates one thousand, then purchases his father from what remains, and he has a son, then according to the opinion of those who said that the purchase is not a bequest: The father becomes free, and an amount of one-third of the wealth at the time of death is executed from the donation, and as for what remains, the father has one-sixth of it, and the rest is for the son. According to the opinion of the Qadi and those who consider it a bequest: The father does not become free; because the donation of the terminally ill person is only executed within the one-third, and the first [transaction] is given priority. When the donation is given priority, nothing remains of the one-third, and the son inherits from him, so he becomes free through him.