our companions, the contract is valid, but the condition is void. [For the Qadi] said regarding one who stipulates that he may plant wheat in the land and may not plant anything else: the condition is void, but the contract is valid. It is also possible that the condition is valid. This is one of the two views of the companions of al-Shafi'i, because the lessee owns the usufruct from the lessor, so he does not possess what he has not consented to, and because he may have a purpose in restricting him to realizing this specific benefit. They said in the other view: The condition is void because it contradicts the requirement of the contract, as its requirement is the ownership of the usufruct, the authority to realize it himself or through his deputy, and to realize some of it himself and some through his deputy. The condition contradicts this, so it is void. Does it invalidate the contract? There are two views on this; the more correct of the two is that it does not invalidate it, because it affects neither benefit nor harm to the lessor, so it is disregarded, and the contract remains as its implication dictates. The other view is that it does invalidate it, because it contradicts its implication, similar to the case if he stipulated that he shall not realize the benefits at all.

Section: It is permissible for the lessee to lease the leased property once he has taken possession of it. Ahmad stated this textually. This is the view of Sa'id ibn al-Musayyib, Ibn Sirin, Mujahid, 'Ikrimah, Abu Salamah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman, al-Nakha'i, al-Sha'bi, al-Thawri, al-Shafi'i, and the Ashab al-Ra'y (the Hanafi school). The Qadi mentioned another narration regarding this, which is that it is not permissible, because the Prophet (peace be upon him) forbade profiting from what is not guaranteed. The usufructs have not entered into his guarantee. [And because he contracted over something that has not entered into his guarantee], it is not permitted, similar to the sale of measured or weighed goods before taking possession of them. The first view is more correct, because taking possession of the object acts in place of taking possession of the usufruct, evidenced by the fact that it is permissible to dispose of it, thus the contract over it is permissible, similar to the sale of fruit on a tree. The analogy for the other narration is invalidated by this principle. Once established