Section: It is permissible to make a bequest to a man for one thing to the exclusion of another. For instance, he may make a bequest to a person for the distribution of his bequests but not for anything else, or for the payment of his debts, or exclusively for looking after the affairs of his children; in which case, he has no authority beyond what was granted to him. It is permissible to make a bequest to one person for the distribution of his bequests, to another for the payment of his debts, and to a third for looking after the affairs of his children, whereby each of them has only the authority granted to him and nothing else. Whenever one makes a bequest to someone for a specific thing, he does not become an executor in other matters. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifah said: He becomes an executor in everything that an executor is empowered to do, because this is an authority that transfers from the father upon his death, and therefore it cannot be partitioned, like the authority of a grandfather. Our view is that he has acquired the power to act through permission from a human source, so it is restricted to what has been permitted, like an agent, and the analogy to the authority of the grandfather is invalid. Furthermore, that authority is one acquired by kinship, which does not admit partitioning, whereas permission does admit partitioning; thus, they are distinct.

Section: It is permissible to make a bequest to two men together regarding one thing, while granting each of them the power to act individually, by saying: "I have bequeathed to each of you the authority to act individually." This is because he made each of them a sole executor, and this necessitates that each may act independently. He may also make a bequest to both of them to act jointly, in which case neither of them has the right to act independently because he did not grant that to them, and he was not satisfied with the judgment of only one of them. I am not aware of any disagreement regarding these two scenarios. If he speaks in general terms, saying: "I have bequeathed to you both regarding such and such," then neither of them may act independently. This is the opinion of Malik and al-Shafi'i. Abu Yusuf said: He may do so, because a bequest and authority cannot be partitioned, so each of them possesses the power to act independently, like two brothers in the marriage of their sister. Abu Hanifah and Muhammad said: It is judged by way of istihsan (juristic preference) as an exception to the rules of qiyas (analogy), permitting each of them to act independently in seven matters: the funeral shroud of the deceased, the payment of his debts, the execution of his bequests, the return of a specific deposit, the purchase of what the child must have in terms of clothing and food, the acceptance of a gift on his behalf, and litigation on behalf of the deceased regarding what is claimed for him or against him, because it is burdensome to require their joint action in these matters and delaying them would be harmful; therefore, independent action is permitted. Our view is that he associated them both in the authority, so neither of them may act independently, just like two agents. We agree with what Abu Yusuf said; indeed, he placed the authority in both of them to act jointly, so it is not partitioned, just as if he had appointed two agents or explicitly stated to the two executors that they should not act except jointly. Consequently, what he said is invalidated by these two scenarios, and what Abu Hanifah said is also invalidated by them. If their joint action becomes impossible, the judge shall appoint a trustworthy person in place of the absent one.