this, for it is not permissible to lease it except to someone who stands in his place, or is of lesser potential for damage, for the reason mentioned previously. As for leasing it before taking possession of it, it is not permissible to do so from anyone other than the lessor, according to one of the two views. This is the view of Abu Hanifah and the most well-known of the two views of al-Shafi'i; because the usufructs are owned through a contract of exchange, so possession is considered a requirement for the validity of the contract over them, just as it is for tangible assets. The other view is that it is permissible, which is the view of some of the Shafi'is; because the possession of the tangible asset does not transfer the guarantee (daman) to him, so the validity of disposing of it is not contingent upon that. Regarding leasing it before taking possession from the lessor, if we say that it is not permissible from anyone other than the lessor, then there are two views here: one is that it is not permissible, because he contracted over it before taking possession of it. The second is that it is permissible; because possession is not impossible for him, unlike the case of a third party. Their foundation is that the sale of food before taking possession of it is not valid from anyone other than its seller, according to a single narration. Is it valid from its seller? There are two narrations. As for leasing it after taking possession of it from the lessor, it is permissible. Al-Shafi'i stated this. Abu Hanifah said: It is not permissible; because this leads to a contradiction of legal rulings, for the delivery is mandatory upon the [lease payment; so when] he rents it, he becomes entitled to it, and thus becomes entitled to what he is himself obligated for, and this is a contradiction. To us, every contract that is permissible with someone other than the contracting party is also permissible with the contracting party, such as a sale. What they mentioned is not valid; because the delivery has already occurred, and this entitlement is for a different delivery. Furthermore, it is invalidated by a sale, for he is entitled to the delivery of the asset, so when he purchases it, he becomes entitled to its delivery. If it is said: The delivery here is mandatory for the entire duration, unlike in a sale. We say: What is mandatory is the delivery of the asset, and that has been accomplished, and there is no other delivery required from him, except that the asset remains under the guarantee of the lessor. If the usufructs become impossible due to the destruction of the house or its seizure, he returns to him; because it became impossible due to a cause that was under his guarantee.
(12) Omitted from M. (13) In B: "an". (14) In the original: "ijaratuhu biha". (15) In the original: "al-mukta-ra fa-amma idha". (16) In B: "lahu". (17) In B and M: "wa ghasbiha".
هذا (١٢) فإنَّه لا تَجوزُ إجَارَتُه إلَّا لمن (١٣) يَقُومُ مَقَامَه، أو دُونَه في الضَّرَرِ؛ لما تَقَدَّمَ. فأما إجَارَتُها (١٤) قبلَ قَبْضِها، فلا تجوزُ من غيرِ المُؤْجِرِ، في أحدِ الوَجْهَيْنِ. وهذا قولُ أبى حنيفةَ، والمَشْهُورُ من قَوْلَىِ الشافِعِيِّ؛ لأنَّ المَنافِعَ مَمْلُوكةٌ بِعَقْدِ مُعَاوَضةٍ, فاعْتُبِرَ في جَوَازِ العَقْدِ عليها القَبْضُ، كالأعْيانِ. والآخَرُ، يَجوزُ، وهو قولُ بعضِ الشافِعِيّةِ؛ لأنَّ قَبْضَ العَيْنِ لا يَنْتَقِلُ به الضَّمَانُ إليه، فلم يَقِفْ جَوَازُ التَّصَرُّفِ عليه. فأمَّا إجَارَتُها قبلَ القَبْضِ من المُؤْجِرِ، فإذا قُلْنا: لا يجوزُ من غير المُؤْجِرِ. كان فيها ههُنا وَجْهانِ؛ أحدُهما، لا يجوزُ؛ لأنَّه عَقَدَ عليها قبلَ قَبْضِها. والثاني، يجوزُ؛ لأنَّ القَبْضَ لا يَتَعَذَّرُ عليه، بخِلَافِ الأجْنَبِيِّ. وأصْلُهُما بَيْعُ الطَّعامِ قبلَ قَبْضِه لا يَصِحُّ من غير بائِعِه، رِوَايةً واحِدَةً، وهل يَصِحُّ من بائِعِه؟ على رِوَايَتَيْنِ. فأمَّا إجَارَتُها بعد قَبْضِها من المُؤْجِرِ، فجائِزةٌ. وبهذا قال الشافِعِيُّ. وقال أبو حنيفةَ: لا يجوزُ؛ لأنَّ ذلك يُؤَدِّى إلى تَنَاقُضِ الأحْكامِ، لأنَّ التَّسْلِيمَ مُسْتَحَقٌّ على [الكِرَاءِ، فإذا] (١٥) اكْتَرَاها صارَ مُسْتَحِقًّا له، فيَصِيرُ مُسْتَحِقًّا لما يُسْتَحَقُّ عليه، وهذا تَناقُضٌ. ولَنا، أنَّ كلَّ عَقْدٍ جازَ مع غير العاقِدِ، جازَ مع العاقِدِ، كالبَيْعِ، وما ذَكَرُوه لا يَصِحُّ؛ لأنَّ التَّسْلِيمَ قد حَصَلَ، وهذا المُسْتَحقُّ له تَسْلِيمٌ آخَر. ثم يَبْطُلُ بالبَيْعِ، فإنَّه يسْتَحقُّ عليه تَسْلِيمُ العَيْنِ، فإذا اشْتَرَاها اسْتَحَقَّ تَسْلِيمَها. فإن قيل: التَّسْلِيمُ ههُنا مُسْتَحقٌ في جَمِيعِ المُدّةِ، بخِلَافِ البَيْعِ. قُلْنا: المُسْتَحقُّ تَسْلِيمُ العَيْنِ، وقد حَصَلَ، وليس عليه (١٦) تَسْلِيمٌ آخَرُ، غيرَ أنَّ العَيْنَ مِن ضَمَانِ المُؤْجِرِ، فإذا تَعَذَّرَتِ المَنافِعُ بِتَلَفِ الدّارِ أو غَصْبِها (١٧)، رَجَعَ عليه؛ لأنَّها تَعَذَّرَتْ بِسَبَبٍ كان في ضَمانِه.
(١٢) سقط من: م.(١٣) في ب: "أن".(١٤) في الأصل: "إجارته بها".(١٥) في الأصل: "المكترى فأما إذا".(١٦) في ب: "له".(١٧) في ب، م: "وغصبها".