causes after their undertaking does not depend on anyone's choice or will. If the dower decreases in the woman's possession after the divorce, and he demanded it from her but she withheld it, then she is liable; because she is a usurper. If it was destroyed before he demanded it, the analogy of the school is that she bears no liability, because it came into her possession without her action or aggression on her part, so she is not liable for it, like a deposit. If they differ as to whether he demanded it from her, her statement is accepted, because she is the denier. If he claims that the destruction or decrease occurred before the divorce, and she says it was after, then her statement is also accepted, because he is claiming something that necessitates liability on her, and she denies it, and the statement of the denier is accepted. The manifest opinion of the companions of Ash-Shafi'i is that the woman is liable for what was destroyed or decreased in her possession after the divorce, because it came into her possession by virtue of the termination of the contract, so it resembles a sold item when the contract is rescinded by annulment. Our argument is what we have mentioned. As for the sold item, it is possible to argue against that; and even if we concede it, the rescission, if it was by them or by the buyer, involved causing someone else's property to be in his possession, while in our case there is no action on the woman's part; it came about through the husband's action alone, thus it resembles the case where he throws his garment into her house without her command.
Section: If he Khul' (obtains a divorce for consideration) from his wife after consummation, then marries her again during her waiting period ('Iddah), [then divorces her] (11) before consummating with her again, she is entitled to half of the dower (12) specified in the second marriage. This is the opinion of Ash-Shafi'i. Abu Hanifa said: She is entitled to the whole of it, because the legal effect of intercourse exists in it, evidenced by the fact that if she gives birth to a child, it is attributed to him. Our argument is the saying of Allah, glory be to Him: {And if you divorce them before you have touched them, and you have already appointed for them a dower, then half of what you have appointed}. And because it is a divorce from a marriage in which he has not touched her, so it is required that the dower be halved, just as if he had married her after the waiting period. What he mentioned is incorrect; for the attribution of lineage does not depend on intercourse according to him, so it (13) does not take its place. But if he had also not consummated with her in the first marriage, he owes half of the first dower and half of the second dower without
(11) In A, B, and M: "and he divorced her". (12) In B and M, there is an addition: "or". (13) In M: "not".
الأسبابِ بعدَ مُباشَرَتِها لا يَقفُ على اختيارِ أحدٍ، ولا إرادتِه. فإن نَقَصَ الصَّداقُ فى يَدِ المرأةِ بعدَ الطَّلاقِ، فإن كان قد طالَبها به فمَنَعَتْه، فعليها الضَّمانُ؛ لأنَّها غاصِبةٌ، وإن تَلِفَ قبلَ مُطالَبتِه، فقِياسُ المذهبِ أنَّه لا ضَمانَ عليها؛ لأنَّه حَصَلَ فى يدِها بغير فِعْلِها، ولا عُدْوانٍ من جِهَتِها، فلم تَضْمَنْه، كالوَديعةِ. وإن اخْتَلَفا فى مُطالَبَتِه لها، فالقولُ قولُها؛ لأنَّها مُنْكِرةٌ. وإن ادَّعَى أَنَّ التَّلَفَ أو النَّقْصَ كان قبلَ الطَّلاقِ. وقالت: بعدَه. فالقولُ أيضًا قولُها؛ لأنَّه يَدَّعِى ما يُوجِبُ الضَّمانَ عليها، وهى تُنْكِرُه، والقولُ قولُ المُنْكِرِ. وظاهرُ قولِ أصحابِ الشافعىِّ، أَنَّ على المرأةِ الضَّمانَ لما تَلِفَ أو نَقَصَ فى يَدِها بعدَ الطَّلاقِ؛ لأنَّه حَصَلَ فى يدِها بحُكْمِ قَطْعِ العَقْدِ، فأشْبَهَ المَبِيعَ إذا ارْتَفَعَ العَقْدُ بالفَسْخِ. ولَنا، ما ذكَرْناه. وأمَّا المَبِيعُ فيَحْتَمِلُ أن يَمْنَعَ، وإن سَلَّمْنا فإنَّ الفَسْخَ إن كان منهما، أو من المُشْتَرِى، فقد حَصَلَ منه التَّسَبُّبُ إلى جَعْلِ مِلْكِ غيرِه فى يَدِه، وفى مَسْألَتِنا ليس من المرأةِ فِعْلٌ، وإنَّما حَصَلَ ذلك بفِعْلِ الزوجِ وَحْدَه، فأشْبَهَ ما لو ألْقَى ثَوْبَه فى دارِها بغير أمْرِها.
فصل: ولو خالَعَ امرأتَه بعدَ الدُّخولِ، ثم تزوَّجَها فى عِدّتِها، [ثُمَّ طَلَّقها] (١١) قبلَ دُخولِه بها، فلها فى النِّكاحِ الثانى نِصْفُ الصَّداقِ (١٢) المُسَمَّى فيه. وبهذا قال الشافعىُّ. وقال أبو حنيفةَ: لها جَمِيعُه؛ لأنَّ حُكْمَ الوَطْءِ موجودٌ فيه، بدليلِ أنَّها لو أتَتْ بوَلَدٍ لَزِمَه. ولَنا، قولُ اللَّهِ سبحانه: {وَإِنْ طَلَّقْتُمُوهُنَّ مِنْ قَبْلِ أَنْ تَمَسُّوهُنَّ وَقَدْ فَرَضْتُمْ لَهُنَّ فَرِيضَةً فَنِصْفُ مَا فَرَضْتُمْ}. ولأنَّه طَلاقٌ من نِكاحٍ لم يَمَسَّها فيه، فوَجَبَ أن يتَنَصَّفَ به المَهْرُ، كما لو تزوَّجَها بعدَ العِدَّةِ، وما ذكره غيرُ صحيحٍ؛ فإن لُحُوقَ النَّسبِ لا يَقِفُ على الوَطْءِ عندَه، فلا (١٣) يقومُ مَقامَه. فأمَّا إن كان لم يَدْخُلْ بها فى النِّكاحِ الأَوَّلِ أيضًا، فعليه نِصْفُ الصَّداقِ الأَوَّلِ، ونِصْفُ الصَّداقِ الثانى. بغير
(١١) فى أ، ب، م: "وطلقها".(١٢) فى ب، م زيادة: "أو".(١٣) فى م: "ولا".