The return to its actual entity is prioritized. The mortgage (rahn) holds the same status as these disposals; for although it does not remove ownership of the corpus, it is intended for a sale that does remove ownership, and for this reason, it is not permissible to mortgage what is not permissible to sell. Thus, the return to the actual entity would involve nullifying the mortgagee’s right to the collateral, which is not permissible. The same applies to the contract of manumission for payment (kitabah), for it is intended for the manumission that removes ownership, and it is a binding contract, so it follows the same path as the mortgage. If the husband divorces [her] before the handing over of the gift or the mortgage, or during the option period in a sale, there are two opinions regarding it: The first is that she cannot be compelled to return half of it to him, because it is a contract she concluded while it was in her possession, so she does not have the power to nullify it, just like a binding contract, and because her ownership has ceased, so she does not have the power to reclaim what is no longer her property. The second is that she is compelled to hand over half of it, because she is capable of doing so, and there is no harm in it. Al-Shafi'i has two opinions corresponding to these two positions. As for if he divorces her after the handing over of the gift and the mortgage, and the sale becomes binding, and he has not taken the value of the half until the sale, mortgage, and gift were rescinded, he does not have the right to return to the half of it, because his right is established in the value.

The second category is a non-binding disposal that does not transfer ownership, such as a testamentary bequest (wasiyyah), a partnership (sharikah), and a speculative partnership (mudarabah). This does not invalidate the right to return to half of it, and the existence of this disposal is like its non-existence, because it is a disposal that did not transfer ownership and did not prevent the owner from disposing of it, so it does not prevent the one who has the right to return to the owner from doing so, like bailment (ida'ah) and a borrowed item ('ariyah). As for if she declares it as a tadbir (stipulating that the slave be free upon her death), the apparent position of the school is that it does not prevent the return [because it is a testamentary bequest], or it is a suspension of half of it [being free], and both do not prevent the return, and because it does not prevent a sale, so it does not prevent the return, just like a testamentary bequest. The husband is not compelled to return to half of it; rather, he is given the choice between that and taking half of its value, because the partnership of one whose half is subject to tadbir is a defect, and it is not safe from being referred to a Hanafi judge who might rule for his manumission. If it were a slave woman and she declared her to be subject to tadbir, it is derived from the two narrations: if we say: