free for the sake of God” in a state of contentment, not in anger, I fear it might be divorce.” The other narration is that it is not a divorce, which is the opinion of Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi‘i, except that Abu Hanifa says regarding "count your term," "choose," and "your affair is in your hand" the same as what we say regarding the taking effect of divorce. Both argued that this is not explicit in divorce, and he did not intend it (5) by it, so divorce does not take effect, as is the case in a state of contentment, and because the requirement of the wording does not change between contentment and anger. It is possible that the metonyms that are rarely used in contexts other than separation—such as his saying: "You are free for the sake of God," "count your term," "abstain," "your rope is on your withers," "you are estranged," and similar expressions—take effect in a state of anger. As for the answer to a request for divorce without intention, and what is frequently used for other than that, such as "go," "leave," "depart," or "veil yourself," divorce does not take effect through it except with intention. The school of Abu Hanifa is close to this. The statement of Ahmad and al-Khiraqi regarding the taking effect of divorce only occurred regarding his saying, "You are free," which is something a person does not generally use regarding his wife except as a metonym for divorce. It does not follow from being satisfied with that based on mere anger that others take effect without intention, because what is frequently used is often found to be used without intending divorce in a state of contentment, and thus it is the same in a state of anger, since there is no restriction (6) upon him in using it or speaking it. This is contrary to what is not customary to mention; because its use in other than divorce is rare, its mere mention gives rise to the suspicion that divorce is intended. When this is joined with its occurrence immediately after a request for divorce, or in a state of anger, the suspicion strengthens and becomes a dominant assumption. The reasoning for the other narration is that the indication of the situation changes the ruling of statements and actions. For if one were to say to a man, "O virtuous one [son of the virtuous one]" (7) in a state of honoring him, it would be praise, whereas if he said it in a state of reviling and belittling him, it would be defamation and dispraise. If he said, "He does not betray a trust, nor does he wrong anyone by a mustard seed, and no one is more fulfilling of a trust than he" in a state of praise, it would be eloquent praise, as Hassan (8) said: