it is thus an act of turning away, whereas sitting is the opposite. If she were sitting and then reclined, or reclined and then sat, it would not be void, because that does not nullify thought. If either of them becomes occupied with prayer, the choice is void. If she was in prayer and completed it, her choice is not void. If she added two more rak'ahs to it, her choice is void. If she ate a small amount, or said, 'In the name of Allah,' or performed a little tasbih, it is not void, because that is not an act of turning away. If she said, 'Call witnesses for me so that I may have them witness this,' her choice is not void. If she was riding and continued to travel, her choice is void. All of this is the position of the proponents of Ra'y (the Hanafi school).

Section: If he grants her the choice whenever she wishes, or for a duration, she has that right during that period. If he says, 'Choose whenever you wish,' or 'Whenever you want' [or 'Whenever you may want'], she has that right; because these expressions denote granting her the choice for all times. If he says, 'Choose today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow,' she has that right; if she rejects the choice on the first day, the whole of it is void. Similarly, if he says, 'Do not be hasty until you consult your parents,' and the like, she has the choice on a delayed basis; for the Prophet (peace be upon him) said that to Aisha, which proves that her choice does not become void by delay. If he says, 'Choose yourself today, and choose yourself tomorrow,' and she rejects it on the first day, it does not become void regarding the second. Abu Hanifah said: It does not become void in the first case either, because these are two choices at two different times, so one of them is not void by the rejection of the other, by analogy to the second case. Our evidence is that it is a single choice over a single duration, so if its beginning is void, what follows is void, just as if the choice were for a single day, like the choice of condition and the choice of the emancipated woman. We do not concede that they are two choices; rather, it is a single choice over two days, and it differs from when he says, 'Choose yourself today, and choose yourself tomorrow,' for those are two choices because each one is established by a separate cause. If he gave her the choice for a month, and she chose herself, then he married her again, she would have no choice against him, whereas according to Abu Hanifah, she has the choice. Our evidence is that she has fully utilized what was granted to her in this contract, so she has no claim in a second contract, just as if he had stipulated the choice regarding an item for a period, then canceled, and then bought it through another contract during that period.