impurity, for the analogy to our issue is that he is certain of the impurity of the sleeve of the garment and doubts the impurity of the rest of it; for the ruling of impurity upon it ceases by washing the sleeve alone, and so it is here.

It is possible to reject the occurrence of prohibition here and to reject his certainty of it, for reconciliation is permissible for her husband according to the manifest position of the school. Thus, he is not certain of the prohibition; rather, he is doubtful of it and certain of the permissibility.

Section: If two men see a bird, and one of them swears by divorce that it is a crow, while the other swears by divorce that it is a pigeon, then it flies away and they do not know its state, no ruling of breach is passed against either of them, for the certainty of marriage is established and the occurrence of divorce is doubted. If the wife of one of them claims his breach in her regard, the statement is his, because the original state is with him and certainty is on his side. If the swearer were one person and said: "If it is a crow, my wives are divorced, and if it is a pigeon, my slaves are free," or said: "If it is a crow, Zaynab is divorced, and if it is a pigeon, Hind is divorced," and he does not know what it is, no ruling of breach is passed against him in either case, for he is certain of the marriage and doubtful of the breach, so he does not depart from the certainty of marriage and ownership based on doubt.

However, if one of the two men says: "If it is a crow, my wife is thrice divorced," and the other says: "If it is not a crow, my wife is thrice divorced," then it flies away and they do not know its state, one of them has committed a breach, but not specifically one over the other, and no ruling is passed against either of them specifically. Rather, the rulings of marriage remain in effect for him, such as maintenance, clothing, and housing, because for each one of them, the certainty of his marriage remains and the occurrence of his divorce is doubted. As for intercourse, the Qadi mentioned that it is prohibited for both of them, because one of them has certainly committed a breach and his wife is prohibited to him, and since it is ambiguous, it is prohibited for both, just as if he had committed a breach in one of his two wives without specifying which one. The proponents of reason (Ahl al-Ra'y) and al-Shafi'i said: It is not prohibited for either of them to have intercourse with his wife, because it is ruled that his marriage remains and it is not ruled that the divorce has occurred against him, differing from one who commits a breach in one of his two wives, because it is known that his marriage to one of the two wives has ceased.