the words of al-Khiraqi; for he said: If one breaks an oath while a slave, and does not perform expiation until he is manumitted, then the fast is incumbent upon him, and nothing else suffices him. Similarly, al-Athram said: I heard Abu Abd Allah being asked about a slave who took an oath and then broke it while a slave; he did not perform expiation until he was manumitted, should he perform the expiation of a free man or the expiation of a slave? He said: He should perform the expiation of a slave; because he only performs the expiation for what became incumbent upon him on the day he broke the oath, [not on the day he took the oath. I said to him: He took the oath while a slave, and broke it while a free man? He said: On the day he broke it] (12). He argued, saying: If he slanders while a slave—meaning (13) then is manumitted—he is only lashed with the lashing of a slave. This is one of the opinions of al-Shafi'i. Therefore, according to this narration, his capacity or incapacity is considered at the time of its obligation. If he were wealthy at the time of the obligation, the obligation of [providing] a slave is established for him, and it is not removed by his poverty thereafter. And if he were indigent, his prescribed duty is fasting, so if he becomes wealthy after that, he is not obligated to transfer to [providing] a slave. The second narration is that the consideration is based on the most severe of conditions from the time of the obligation until the time of the expiation, so whenever he finds a slave between the time of obligation and the time of expiation, nothing suffices him except manumission. This is a second opinion of al-Shafi'i; because it is a right that becomes due on the debt by the existence of property, so the more severe of the two states is considered, like the Hajj. He has a third opinion that the consideration is based on the state of performance. This is the opinion of Abu Hanifah and Malik; because it is a right for which he has a substitute from a different genus, so it is considered based on the state of performance, like ablution. Our argument is that the expiation becomes incumbent by way of purification, so the consideration in it is based on the state of obligation (14), like the hadd penalty, or we say: Whoever is obligated to fast for the expiation, is not obligated to do anything else, like the slave if he is manumitted (15). It differs from ablution, for if one performs tayammum then finds water, his tayammum is nullified, whereas here, if he fasts and then becomes capable of [providing] a slave, his fast is not nullified. Ablution is not considered based on the state of performance, for its performance is his action, and it is not based on it; rather, it is based on the performance of prayer, which is different from ablution. As for Hajj, it is a lifetime act of worship, and its entire duration is its time, so whenever he is capable of it in any part of its time, it becomes obligatory, unlike our issue. Furthermore, what they argued is invalidated by the slave if he is manumitted (15), for he is not obligated to transfer to manumission despite what they mentioned.