The same. The second [narration] is that the return does not occur by it, and it is incumbent upon her to initiate a new waiting period; because it is intercourse in a marriage that has become flawed, so it is like the intercourse of doubt. The remainder of the waiting period of the divorce enters into it; because they are from one man. If she becomes pregnant from this intercourse, does the remainder of the first [period] enter into it? There are two perspectives: one is that it enters; because they are from one man. The second is that it does not enter; because they are of two different types. Based on this, when she delivers her child, she completes the waiting period of the divorce. If he has intercourse with her while she is pregnant, there are two perspectives regarding the merging of the two waiting periods: if we say: they merge, then their expiration is together upon the delivery of the child. If we say: they do not merge, then the expiration of the waiting period of the divorce is upon the delivery of the child, and she initiates a waiting period for the intercourse through menstrual cycles.

Section: If he divorces her with a revocable divorce, and she marries during her waiting period someone who has intercourse with her, we have mentioned that she builds upon the waiting period of the first, then initiates a waiting period for the second, and her first husband has the right to return her during the remainder of her waiting period from him; because the return (raj'ah) is a retaining of the wife, and the occurrence of intercourse from a stranger upon the marriage does not prevent the husband from retaining his wife, just as if she were in the midst of the marriage. It is said: He does not have the right to return her; because she is forbidden to him, so it is not valid for him to return her, like a woman who has apostatized. The correct view is the first; for prohibition does not prevent the return, just like the state of ihram. It differs from apostasy; because apostasy leads to an irrevocable separation after the return, unlike the waiting period. When her waiting period from him expires, he does not have the right to return her during the waiting period of the second; because she is not from him. If he returns her during her waiting period from himself, and it was via menstrual cycles or months, his waiting period ceases by the return, and she begins a waiting period from the second, and it is not lawful for him to have intercourse with her until she finishes the waiting period of the second, just as if she were had intercourse with by doubt during the midst of his marriage. If she was observing a waiting period by pregnancy, it is not possible for her to begin the waiting period of the second before the delivery of the child; because it is via menstrual cycles. So when she delivers her child, she begins the waiting period of the second, and if the pregnancy is attributed to the second, then she observes the waiting period.