it is incumbent upon him for two reasons: because she is his daughter, and she is his stepdaughter whose mother he has consummated marriage with.

The Third Section: That he is entitled to half of the young girl's dower, because her marriage was rescinded before he consummated the marriage with her, through no action of her own. When a rescission comes from a third party, it is like the husband's divorce in terms of the necessity of the dowry upon him. There is no dowry for the adult woman if he has not consummated the marriage with her, because the rescission of her marriage was due to a cause from her own side, so her dowry lapsed, just as if she had apostatized. This is the opinion of Malik, al-Shafi'i, Abu Thawr, and the People of Opinion. We know of no disagreement regarding it. If he had consummated the marriage with the adult woman, her dowry does not lapse, because it became established upon his consummation of the marriage with her in a manner that nothing can cause it to lapse, and for this reason, it does not lapse due to her apostasy or anything else.

The Fourth Section: That he has recourse against the adult woman for what he is liable for regarding the young girl's dowry. This is the opinion of al-Shafi'i. It is narrated from some of his companions that he has recourse for her entire dowry, because she destroyed the marital relationship (bud'), so compensation for it is due. The People of Opinion said: If the breastfeeding woman intended corruption, he has recourse against her for half the dowry; otherwise, he has no recourse for anything. Malik said: He has no recourse for anything. Our argument regarding his recourse against her for the half is that she confirmed it upon him, obligated him with it, and destroyed for him that which was in its stead, so compensation became due upon her, as if she had destroyed the object of a sale for him. Our argument against Abu Hanifah is that what is liable in cases of intent is also liable in cases of error, like property, and because she corrupted his marriage and confirmed half the dowry upon him, [so its compensation became incumbent upon her], as if she had intended the corruption. Our argument that the husband only has recourse for half is that the husband did not lose anything but the half, so he is not entitled to more than what he lost, and because by the rescission, the substitute for the other half returned to him, so he is not entitled to the substitute for what he already took as a substitute another time, and because the exit of the marital relationship from the husband's ownership has no value, and the breastfeeding woman only became liable here when she obligated the husband with what was exposed to lapsing due to a cause originating from the wife, so he does not have recourse here for more than what she obligated him with.