The wives upon their adult husbands, and the slave woman is included in their generality. Also, because she is a wife who enables access to herself, therefore her maintenance is mandatory upon her husband, like a free woman. If her husband is a slave, then maintenance is mandatory for his wife for that reason. Ibn al-Mundhir said: Everyone I remember (4) among the scholars has reached consensus that the slave is responsible for the maintenance of his wife. This is the view of Al-Sha'bi, Al-Hakam, and Al-Shafi'i. The scholars of opinion also held this view if he has provided her a house. It was narrated from Malik that he said: Her maintenance is not upon him; because maintenance is a form of compassion (muwasah), and he is not one of those capable of it, and for that reason, the maintenance of his relatives is not mandatory upon him, nor is the Zakat of his wealth. Our evidence is that it is a mandatory compensation in marriage, so it becomes mandatory upon the slave, like the dower (mahr). The proof that it is compensation is that it is required in exchange for enabling access, and this is why it lapses for a free man upon the loss of the ability to access; it is distinct from the maintenance of relatives. Once its obligation upon the slave is established, it becomes binding upon his master; because the master granted permission (5) for the marriage that leads to this obligation. Ibn Abi Musa said: There is another report in this regard, that it is obligatory upon the slave’s earnings. This is the view of the followers of Al-Shafi'i; because it is not (6) possible to obligate it upon his liability (dhimmah), nor his person (raqabah), nor the liability of his master, and it cannot be dropped, so nothing remains but that it attaches to his earnings. The Qadi said: It attaches to his person; [because sexual intercourse in marriage is like a crime, and the compensation for a slave’s crime attaches to his person] (7), so he is sold for it, or his master ransoms him. This is the view of the followers of opinion. Our evidence is that it is a debt for which the master gave permission, so it becomes binding (8) upon his liability, like that which his agent borrows. Their statement that it is in exchange for intercourse is incorrect; for it is mandatory even without intercourse, and it is mandatory for the woman who has a physical barrier (ratqa'), the menstruating woman, the woman in post-partum bleeding, the wife of a castrated man (majbub), and the minor. It is only mandatory by enabling access, and that is neither a crime nor stands in the place of one. The statement of those who said that it is impossible to obligate it upon the master’s liability is incorrect; for there is no obstacle to obligating it, and we have already mentioned that its requirements are present, so there is no meaning to the claim of impossibility.
(4) In B: "yahfazu" (I remember). (5) In M there is an addition: "lahu" (for him). (6) In A: "la" (not). (7) Dropped from B. [Referring to] a scholarly review. (8) In B: "fayalzamu" (it becomes binding).
الزَّوْجاتِ على أزْواجِهِنَّ البالغِينَ، والأمَةُ داخلةٌ في عُمُومِهِنَّ، ولأنَّها زَوْجةٌ مُمَكِّنَةٌ من نَفْسِها، فوَجَبَ على زَوْجِها نَفقَتُها، كالحُرَّةِ، وإن كان زَوْجُها مَمْلوكًا، فالنَّفقةُ واجبةٌ لزَوْجَتِه لذلك. قال ابنُ المُنذرِ: أجْمَعَ كلُّ مَنْ أحْفَظُ (٤) عنه من أهلِ العلمِ، على أنَّ على العَبْدِ نَفقةَ زَوْجَتِه. هذا قولُ الشَّعْبِيِّ، والحَكَمِ، والشافعيِّ. وبه قال أصحابُ الرَّأْىِ إذا بَوّأَها بَيْتًا. وحُكِىَ عن مالكٍ، أنَّه قال: ليس عليه نفقَتُها؛ لأنَّ النَّفقةَ مُواساةٌ، وليس هو من أهْلِها، ولذلك لا تجبُ عليه نفقةُ أقارِبِه، ولا زَكاةُ مالِه. ولَنا، أنَّها عِوَضٌ واجبٌ في النِّكاحِ، فوَجَبَتْ على العبدِ، كالمَهْرِ، والدليلُ على أنَّها عِوَضٌ، أنَّها تجبُ في مُقَابلةِ التَّمْكينِ، ولهذا تَسْقُطُ عن الحُرِّ بفَوَاتِ التَّمْكِينِ، وفارَقَ نفقةَ الأقارِبِ. إذا ثَبَتَ وُجُوبُها على العبدِ، فإنَّها تَلْزَمُ سَيِّدَه؛ لأنَّ السَّيِّدَ أذِنَ (٥) في النكاحِ المُفْضِى إلى إيجابِها. وقال ابنُ أبي موسى: فيه رِوايةٌ أُخْرَى، أنَّها تجبُ في كَسْبِ العبدِ. وهو قولُ أصحابِ الشافعيِّ؛ لأنَّه لم (٦) يُمْكِنْ إيجابُها في ذمَّتِه، ولا رَقَبَتِه، ولا ذِمَّةِ سيِّدِه، ولا إسْقاطُها، فلم يَبْقَ إلَّا أن تتَعَلَّقَ بكَسْبِه. وقال القاضي: تتَعَلَّقُ برَقَبَتِه؛ [لأنَّ الوَطْءَ في النكاحِ بمنزلةِ الجِنايَةِ، وأرْشُ جِنَايَةِ العبدِ يَتَعلَّقُ برَقَبَتِه] (٧)، يُباعُ فيها، أو يَفْدِيه سَيِّدُه. وهذا قولُ أصْحابِ الرّأْيِ. ولَنا، أنَّه دَيْنٌ أَذِنَ السَّيِّدُ فيه، فلَزِمَ (٨) ذِمَّتَه، كالذى اسْتَدانَه وَكِيلُه. وقولُهم: إنَّه في مُقابَلةِ الوَطْءِ. غيرُ صحيحٍ؛ فإنَّه يجبُ من غيرِ وَطْءٍ، ويجبُ للرَّتْقاءِ، والحائضِ، والنُّفَسَاءِ، وزَوْجةِ المَجْبُوبِ والصغيرِ، وإنَّما يجبُ بالتَّمْكِينِ، وليس ذلك بجنايةٍ ولا قائمٍ مَقامَها. وقولُ مَنْ قال: إنه تَعَذَّرَ إيجابُه في ذِمَّةِ السَّيِّدِ. غيرُ صحيحٍ؛ فإنَّه لا مانِعَ من إيجابِه، وقد ذكَرْنا وُجُودَ مُقْتَضِيه، فلا مَعْنَى لدَعْوَى التَّعَذُّرِ.
(٤) في ب: "يحفظ".(٥) في م زيادة: "له".(٦) في أ: "لا".(٧) سقط من: ب. نقل نظر.(٨) في ب: "فيلزم".