And he said: "If the people of Sana'a had conspired against him, I would have killed them all." (5) From Ali, may Allah be pleased with him, it is narrated that he killed three men who killed one man. (6) And from Ibn Abbas, it is narrated that he killed a group for one person, (6) and no opponent to them was known in their era, so it constitutes a consensus (ijma'). Furthermore, this is a punishment that becomes due [for one person against one person, so it becomes due for the one] (7) against the group, like the hadd punishment for slander (qadhf). It differs from blood money (diya), for that can be divided (into shares), whereas retaliation (qisas) cannot be divided. Furthermore, if retaliation were to lapse due to joint participation, it would lead to hastening toward murder by means of it, which would lead to the nullification of the wisdom of deterrence and restraint.

Section: It is not a requirement for the obligation of retaliation upon those who participate jointly that there be equality in the cause of it. If one man wounded him with one wound and another with a hundred, or if one of them wounded him with a mudhiha (a wound exposing the bone) and the other with an amma (a head wound reaching the brain), or one of them with a ja'ifa (a deep body wound) and the other with a non-ja'ifa wound, and he died, they are equal regarding retaliation and blood money. This is because considering equality would lead to the lapse of retaliation upon joint participants, since two wounds are rarely equal in every respect. And if equality were a possibility, the ruling would not be established; because a condition requires certainty of its existence, and the mere possibility of its existence is not sufficient; rather, ignorance of its existence is like knowledge of its non-existence in terms of the negation of the ruling. Furthermore, it is possible that he died from a single wound without the hundred, just as it is possible he died from the mudhiha without the amma, and from the non-ja'ifa without the ja'ifa. Furthermore, when wounds result in the loss of life, their consideration [as individual wounds] lapses, so the ruling on the group is like the ruling on the individual. Do you not see that if one were to sever all his limbs and he died, one blood money is due, just as if one severed one limb and he died?

Section: If three people participate in the killing of a man, and one of them cuts off his hand, another his leg, and the third wounds him with a mudhiha, and he dies, the guardian (wali) has the right to kill all of them, or to pardon them for blood money, in which case he takes one-third of it from each one. He also has the right to pardon one of them, in which case he takes one-third of the blood money from him and kills the other two. He also has the right to pardon two of them, in which case he takes two-thirds of the blood money from them and kills the third. If the wound of one of them heals, and he dies from the other two wounds, the guardian has the right to take retaliation from the one whose wound healed with the equivalent of his wound, and to kill the other two, or to take a full blood money from them, or to kill one of them and take half the blood money from the other. He also has the right to pardon the one whose wound healed and take from him the blood money for his wound. If the one who inflicted the mudhiha claims that his wound healed before his death, and his two partners deny it, you should look to the guardian: if he believes him, the ruling of healing is established with respect to him, so he does not have the right to kill him or demand from him one-third of the blood money; he only has the right to take retaliation from him for the mudhiha or take its indemnity (arsh). His statement is not accepted regarding his two partners; because the base principle is the non-existence of healing in them. However, if the guardian chooses retaliation, there is no benefit for them in denying it, because he has the right to kill them both, whether or not it healed. And if he chooses blood money, they are not liable for more than two-thirds of it. If the guardian denies him, he must take an oath, and he then has the right to take retaliation from him or demand from him one-third of the blood money, and he would not have the right to demand from his two partners more than two-thirds of it. If his two partners testify for him that it healed, they become liable for the full blood money; because of their admission of its obligation. The guardian may take it from them if he believes them. If he does not believe them and pardons them for blood money, he has no right to more than two-thirds of it; because he does not claim more than that. Their testimony for him is accepted if they have repented and have been declared trustworthy ('udul); because they do not thereby draw any benefit to themselves, so retaliation lapses from him, and he is not liable for more than the indemnity of a mudhiha.

Section: If a man cuts off his hand at the wrist, then another cuts it off at the elbow, and then he dies, you should look: if the first wound healed before the second cut, then the second person is the sole killer, and upon him is the capital punishment (qawad) or the full blood money if he pardons him from killing. He [the guardian] has the right to cut off the hand of the first or take half the blood money. And if it did not heal, then they are both killers, and they are liable for retaliation for the life (qisas fi al-nafs), and if he pardons them for blood money, it becomes due from them. Al-Shafi'i held this view. Abu Hanifa said: [The killer is] the second one alone,