And there is no retaliation on the first for the life; because the second’s cutting is a cutting of continuation (sirayah); he cut it while it was bleeding and he died after his crime had ceased, so it is similar to what if his wound had healed. Malik said: If the second cut him immediately after the first cut him, they are both killed. If he lived after the first cut until he ate and drank, and then died immediately after the second cut, then the second is the sole killer. If he lived after both until he ate and drank, then the guardians have the choice to swear against whichever they wish and kill him. Our argument is that these are two cuts, where if he had died after each one of them separately, retaliation would be obligatory upon him. So if he dies after both of them, retaliation is obligatory upon them, just as if it were on two hands. Furthermore, the second cut does not prevent the criminality of the one after it, so the ruling of what preceded it does not lapse, as if it were on two hands. We do not concede that his criminality ceases, nor that the cutting of his continuation ceases; for the pain resulting from the first cut did not disappear, rather the second pain was added to it, so the life became weakened from bearing them both, and perished by them both; therefore the killing was by them both. This is unlike healing; for the pain that occurred in the noble limbs does not remain with it, so they differ. If the first claims that his wound healed, and the guardian believes him, the killing lapses from him, and he is liable for retaliation on the hand or half the blood money. If his partner denies it, and the guardian chooses retaliation, he has no benefit in denying it; because his killing is obligatory. If he pardons him for the blood money, the statement is his with his oath, and he is not liable for more than half the blood money. If the guardian denies the first, he must take an oath, and he has the right to kill him; because the base principle is the non-existence of what he claimed. If the second claims his wound healed, the ruling regarding it is the same as the ruling regarding the first if he were to claim that.

1429 - Issue: He said: (And if they cut off a hand, its counterpart is cut off from each one of them)

The general principle is that if a group participates in a wound that necessitates retaliation, retaliation becomes obligatory upon all of them. This is the view of Malik, al-Shafi'i, Ishaq, and Abu Thawr. Al-Hasan, al-Zuhri, al-Thawri, the اصحاب الرأي (People of Opinion), and Ibn al-Mundhir said: Two hands are not cut for one hand. This is also established as a view in the school of Ahmad; because it was narrated from him that a group is not killed for one person. This is an alert that limbs are not taken for one limb; because equality is observed in them, as evidenced by the fact that we do not take a sound limb for a paralyzed one, nor a full-fingered one for a deficient one, nor an original for an extra, nor an extra for an original, nor a right for a left, nor a left for a right, nor do we equate between one limb and multiple limbs; therefore, the obligation of retaliation between them is prevented. Equality is not considered in the case of life (nafs), for we take a sound person for a sick one, and a sound-limbed person for one whose limbs are cut or paralyzed. And because, in retaliation for limbs, equality in the act of cutting itself is considered, such that if each one cut from a side, retaliation would not be obligatory, unlike the case of life. And because participation that necessitates retaliation in the case of life happens often, so retaliation became obligatory as a deterrent against it, so that it would not be taken as a means to frequent killing; while the participation that is disputed does not occur except in extreme rarity, so there is no need for deterrent against it. And because making retaliation obligatory upon those who participate in the case of life results in deterrence against all participation, or against customary participation, whereas making it obligatory upon those who participate in the case of a limb does not result in deterrence against customary participation, nor against anything of participation, except for a form that is rare in occurrence and difficult to exist. Thus, making retaliation obligatory for the sake of deterrence against it would be preventing something that is impossible in itself due to its difficulty, and allowing it in the easy, customary cutting by denying retaliation upon its perpetrator. This has no benefit, unlike participation in the case of life. What confirms this is that the obligation of retaliation upon a group for one in the case of life and limbs is contrary to the original principle, because he takes in the exaction more than what he caused to be lost.