all of them. This is the view of Malik, al-Shafi'i, Ishaq, and Abu Thawr. Al-Hasan, al-Zuhri, al-Thawri, the People of Opinion (Ashab al-Ra'y), and Ibn al-Mundhir said: Two hands are not cut for one hand. This is also established as a view in the school of Ahmad; because it was narrated from him that a group is not killed for one person. This is an alert that limbs are not taken for one limb; because equality is observed in them, as evidenced by the fact that we do not take a sound limb for a paralyzed one, nor a full-fingered one for a deficient one, nor an original for an extra, nor an extra for an original, nor a right for a left, nor a left for a right, nor do we equate between one limb and multiple limbs; therefore, the obligation of retaliation between them is prevented. Equality is not considered in the case of life (nafs), for we take a sound person for a sick one, and a sound-limbed person for one whose limbs are cut or paralyzed. And because, in retaliation for limbs, equality in the act of cutting itself is considered, such that if each one cut from a side, retaliation would not be obligatory, unlike the case of life. And because participation that necessitates retaliation in the case of life happens often, so retaliation became obligatory as a deterrent against it, so that it would not be taken as a means to frequent killing; while the participation that is disputed does not occur except in extreme rarity, so there is no need for deterrent against it. And because making retaliation obligatory upon those who participate in the case of life results in deterrence against all participation, or against customary participation, whereas making it obligatory upon those who participate in the case of a limb does not result in deterrence against customary participation, nor against anything of participation, except for a form that is rare in occurrence and difficult to exist, requiring effort to bring about. Thus, making retaliation obligatory for the sake of deterrence against it would be preventing something that is impossible in itself due to its difficulty, and allowing it in the easy, customary cutting by denying retaliation upon its perpetrator. This has no benefit, unlike participation in the case of life. What confirms this is that the obligation of retaliation upon a group for one in the case of life and limbs is contrary to the original principle, because he takes in the exaction more than what he caused to be lost.