it, and it interferes with the equivalence stipulated by the prohibition of what is other than it. This principle was only departed from in the case of lives as a deterrent against the participation by which killing usually occurs. Therefore, in what is beyond that, one must remain upon the original principle of prohibition. Furthermore, life is more noble than a limb, and the preservation of it by taking a group for one person does not necessitate the preservation of what is lesser than it by the same means.

As for us, there is the narration that two witnesses testified before Ali, may Allah be pleased with him, against a man for theft, so he cut off his hand. Then they came with another and said: "This is the thief, and we erred regarding the first one." He rejected their testimony against the second and made them liable for the blood money (diyah) of the first one's hand. He said: "Had I known that you had done this intentionally, I would have cut both your hands." He thus indicated that retaliation is applicable to each one of them had they intentionally cut one hand. Also, because it is one of the types of retaliation, a group is taken for one individual just as in the case of lives. As for the consideration of equality, its equivalent exists in the case of lives; we consider equality in them, for we do not take a Muslim for a disbeliever, nor a free man for a slave. As for taking a sound-limbed person for one whose limbs were already cut, it is because the limb is not part of the life being retaliated for; rather, it is lost as a consequence, and for this reason, their blood money is the same, unlike the deficient or paralyzed hand compared to the sound one, for their blood money differs. As for the consideration of equality in the act, it was only considered in the hand because it is possible to perform it by direct cutting; if each of them cut from a side, the act of each one is distinct from the act of his companion, so one cannot be held responsible for cutting a location he did not similarly cut. As for life, it is not possible to perform it by a distinct act; rather, their actions occur upon the body, and its pain leads to the life being taken, and the pain of one person's act is not distinguishable from the pain of the other's act, so they are like two people cutting a single location.