pardoned him then severed it, or as if a stranger had severed it. As for if he severed it then killed him, it is possible that he is also liable for it; because he is liable for it if he pardons him, so likewise if he does not pardon him, because pardon is an act of beneficence, and thus it cannot be a cause for liability. It is also possible that he is not liable for it. This is the opinion of Abu Hanifa; because if he had severed it wrongfully and then killed him, he would not be liable for the limb, so it is more appropriate that he should not be liable for it when the killing is a justified right. As for retaliation (qisas), it is not applicable in this sense under any circumstance. We know of no disagreement regarding this; because retaliation is a punishment that is warded off by doubts (shubuhat), and the doubt here is realized, as he is entitled to the destruction of this limb implicitly due to his entitlement to the destruction of the whole. It does not necessarily follow from the lapse of retaliation that the blood money (diya) is not obligatory, as evidenced by its prevention due to the lack of equivalence. As for if the perpetrator had severed his limb and then killed him, and he exacted retaliation from him by the like of his act, we have already mentioned this in what has passed. And if he severed a limb other than that which the perpetrator had severed—such as if the perpetrator had severed his hand, and the one exacting retaliation severed his leg—it is possible that it is in the position of what if he had severed his hand; because their blood money is the same. It is also possible that the blood money of the leg is incumbent upon him; because the perpetrator did not sever it, so it is similar to if he had not severed his hand.

Section: As for if the excess in exacting retaliation is in the limb, such as if he is entitled to sever one finger, but he severs two, then its ruling is the ruling of the one who severs initially. If it was intentional from a joint, or a wound (shajja) for which retaliation is due in its like, then retaliation is due upon him for the excess. And if it was by mistake, or a wound that does not necessitate retaliation—such as someone who is entitled to a "mudiha" (exposing the bone) wound, but he exacts a "hashima" (fracturing the bone) wound—then he is liable for the indemnity (arsh) of the excess, unless that was caused by an act of the perpetrator, such as his trembling during the exaction of retaliation, in which case there is nothing upon the one exacting retaliation; because it resulted from the act of the perpetrator.