the arrow until he was emancipated and became a Muslim, there is no qisas (retaliation), and upon him is the blood-money of a free Muslim, if he dies from the shot (1).

This is the view of Ibn Hamid and the school of al-Shafi'i. Abu Bakr said: Retaliation is obligatory because he killed someone equivalent to him unjustly and intentionally, so retaliation is obligatory, just as if he had been a free Muslim at the time of the shooting. This is confirmed by the fact that the consideration is given to the state at the time of the injury (3), evidenced by the fact that if he shot at a living Muslim and the arrow did not strike him until he apostatized or died, nothing is required of him; and if he shot at a disbelieving slave and the arrow did not strike him until he was emancipated and became a Muslim, then upon him is the blood-money of a free Muslim. Abu Hanifah said: Upon him, regarding the slave, is the blood-money of a slave for his master, because the injury resulted from sending the arrow, so the consideration is given to it, as in the state of the wounding. As for the disbeliever, his school holds that his blood-money is that of a Muslim, and that a Muslim is killed for him, and likewise a free person is killed for a slave. Our argument for warding off retaliation is that he did not intend to strike a soul equivalent to him at the time of the shooting, so no retaliation is required, as if he had shot at an enemy combatant or an apostate who then became a Muslim. Regarding Abu Hanifah’s position, he destroyed a free person, so he is liable for the compensation of free people, as if he had aimed at game. What he says is invalidated by cases where he shoots at a living person and hits him while dead, or shoots at a healthy person and hits him while defective. Our argument that his blood-money is due to his heirs rather than his master is that if he becomes a Muslim, his blood-money is due to his Muslim heirs, not the disbelievers, if he dies as a free Muslim. Thus, his blood-money belongs to his Muslim heirs, just as if he were in that state at the time of the shooting, and because inheritance is only merited upon death, so his state at that time is considered, not at the time of the cause of death. This is evidenced by what happens if he becomes ill while a disbelieving slave, then becomes a Muslim and dies from that same ailment. The obligation is a replacement for the location (of the harm), so it is considered based on the location that was lost thereby, and it is obligatory according to its extent, and the soul of a free Muslim was lost thereby. Retaliation is a penalty for an act, so the act and the injury are considered together, because they are its two ends, and for that reason, retaliation was not obligatory for his killing.