al-'As, to the son of the slain, seven blood moneys, but he did not accept them. If it is said: Why is he not released, like someone unable to pay a debt? We say: Because releasing him would lead to the loss of the right, as there is no guarantee he would not flee. The distinction between him and the insolvent debtor is made from several perspectives: First, the repayment of debt is not obligatory during insolvency, so he is not imprisoned for what is not obligatory, whereas retaliation here is obligatory, and it is only the one who fulfills it that is unavailable. Second, when we imprison an insolvent debtor, it becomes impossible for him to earn money to repay the debt, so it is of no benefit and even causes harm to both parties; whereas here, the right itself is lost by release, not by imprisonment. Third, his killing has been necessitated, which entails the forfeiture of his life and his utility; so, if the forfeiture of his life becomes impossible, the forfeiture of his utility is permissible because it is possible. If it is said: Why is he imprisoned on behalf of the absent one, when the judge has no authority over him if he is a competent and mature person, just as if he found some of his usurped property, he would not have the right to seize it? We say: Because there is a right for the deceased in retaliation, and the judge has authority over it, which is why his bequests are executed from the blood money and his debts are paid from it. The analogy is that if the judge finds something from the deceased's estate in someone's possession as a usurpation, and the heir is absent, he takes it. If the retaliation were for a living person regarding his limb, he would not interfere with the one against whom it is due. If the killer provides a guarantor for his own person so that he may be released, it is not permissible; because a guarantee (kafala) is not valid in retaliation. The purpose of a guarantee is the fulfillment of the right from the guarantor if it is impossible to bring the guaranteed person, but it is impossible to fulfill it from anyone other than the killer; therefore, the guarantee for it is not valid, like the prescribed penalty (hadd). Moreover, there is an element of jeopardy to the right of the ward, as he might release him and he would flee, causing the right to be lost.

Section: If some of the heirs kill him without the permission of the others, no retaliation is due upon him. This is the position stated by Abu Hanifa, and it is one of the two statements of Al-Shafi'i. The latter statement is that retaliation is due upon him; because he is forbidden from killing him, and part of him is not rightfully his, and retaliation may become due by destroying part of a life, as evidenced by when a group participates in killing one person. Our position is that he is a partner in the entitlement to kill, so retaliation is not due upon him