According to the Qadi, if the principal pardoned [the killing] for blood money, then he is entitled to the blood money from the perpetrator's estate, and the perpetrator's heirs have the right to demand the blood money for him from the agent, while the principal has no right to demand anything from the agent. If it is asked: You have stated, in a case where retaliation was due to two brothers and one of them killed [the perpetrator], that he owes half the blood money, and his brother has the right to demand it from him, according to one view. We say: In that case, he destroyed his [the brother's] right, so he is entitled to restitution for it from him. Here, however, he destroyed it after the principal's right to it had lapsed, so the two cases are different. If we say that the agent may seek recourse from the principal, it is possible that both blood moneys cancel each other out; because there is no benefit in the heirs taking it from the agent, then paying it to the principal, only for the principal to return it to the agent, as this would be a burden on each of them with no benefit. It is also possible that it is necessary; because the blood money binding upon the agent's liability is not for the one against whom the agent has the right of recourse, and the two blood moneys only cancel each other out if each of the two debtors has against the other the equivalent of what the other has against him. Furthermore, the two blood moneys might differ, such as one of the victims being a man and the other a woman. Based on this, the perpetrator's heirs take his blood money from the agent, and they pay the principal the blood money of his ward, then the principal returns to the agent the amount he paid. If the perpetrator's heirs assign the principal to the agent for the blood money of their ward, it is valid. If the perpetrator has a lower blood money, such as a woman who killed a man, and the agent killed her, then her heirs may assign the principal to the blood money due for her; because that is the amount owed to them by the agent, so it lapses for both the agent and the principal together, and the principal seeks recourse from her heirs for half the blood money of his ward. If the perpetrator was a man who killed a woman, and the agent killed him, then the perpetrator's heirs may assign the principal for the woman's blood money; because the principal is not entitled to more than her blood money from them, and they demand from the agent half of the perpetrator's blood money, then he seeks recourse for it from the principal.

Section: If an injury is inflicted upon a person, other than the loss of life, that necessitates retaliation, and he pardons the retaliation, then the injury extends to his life and he dies, retaliation is not required. Abu Hanifah and al-Shafi'i stated this. It is narrated from Malik that retaliation is mandatory, because the injury has become a life, and he did not pardon it. Our position is that it is impossible to fulfill the retaliation for the life without also including that which he pardoned, so it lapses regarding the life, just as if one of the heirs had pardoned it. Furthermore, because when an injury does not have retaliation attached to it despite its possibility, it is not required in its extension (siraayah), just as if one cut the hand of an apostate, then he converted to Islam, and then died from it. It is examined; if he pardoned it for property, he is entitled to the full blood money. If he pardoned it for something other than property, the blood money is required, excluding the damages (arsh) for the wound that he pardoned. Al-Shafi'i stated this. Abu Hanifah said: The full blood money is required, because the injury has become a life, and his right is in the life, not in what he pardoned, and retaliation only lapsed due to the ambiguity (shubhah). If he says: "I have pardoned the injury," nothing is required, because the injury is not specific to the cutting. The Qadi said, regarding the case where he pardoned the cutting: The apparent meaning of Ahmad's words is that nothing is required. Abu Yusuf and Muhammad also stated this, because it is an injury that is not liable, so its extension is likewise. Our position is that it is the extension of an injury that necessitated liability, so it is liable, as it would be if he had not pardoned it. The liability for it was only lost due to his pardoning it, so the loss is limited to what he pardoned and not anything else, and what was pardoned was half the blood money; because the injury necessitated half the blood money. So when he pardoned it, that which was required lapsed, not what was not required. Thus, when it became a life, half the blood money was required by the extension, and the damages for the wound were not lost in a case where he did not pardon it, and the blood money was only completed by the extension.

Section: If the wound is one that does not have retaliation in it, such as a deep abdominal wound (ja'ifah) and the like, and he pardons the retaliation for it, then it extends to the life, his heir has the right to retaliation; because retaliation was not required for the wound, so his pardon for it was not valid, and retaliation was only required after his pardon, and he has the right to pardon the retaliation, and he has the right to the full blood money. If he pardoned the blood money for the wound, it is valid, and after the extension, he is entitled to the blood money for the life, minus the damages for