Among those who said that a wounded person's pardon of his blood is valid are Malik, Tawus, al-Hasan, Qatada, and al-Awza'i. The companions of al-Shafi'i said: If he says, "I have pardoned the injury and what arises from it," there are two opinions on it. One of them is that it is a bequest, so it is based upon the bequest to the killer; regarding this there are two opinions: one is that it is not valid, so the blood money for the life is required, excluding the blood money for the wound. The second is that it is valid; if it is covered by the third [of the estate], it lapses, and if not, the portion that is covered by the third lapses, and the remainder is required. The second opinion is that it is not a bequest, because it is a waiver during life, so it is not valid, and the blood money for the life is incumbent, excluding the blood money for the wound. As for us, he has waived his right after the cause for it was established, so it lapses, just as if he had waived the right of pre-emption (shuf'a) after the sale. Once this is established, there is no difference between whether it is covered by the third or not, because the necessity of the intentional act is retaliation, in one of the two narrations, or one of two things in the other narration; thus, neither the blood money nor the bequest of property is fixed, and that is why a pardon from an insolvent person to something other than property is valid. As for the error-based injury, if he pardons it and what arises from it, its being covered by the third is considered, regardless of whether he pardons using the wording of pardon, bequest, release, or otherwise. If it is covered by the third, his pardon is valid in its entirety; if it is not covered by the third, as much of its blood money as the third can cover lapses from him. This is the position of Malik, al-Thawri, and the people of opinion (ashab al-ra'y). Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, al-Awza'i, and Ishaq said something similar, because the bequest here is for property.

Section: If the perpetrator and the guardian or the injured person disagree, and the perpetrator says, "You pardoned me unconditionally," while the injured person says, "Rather, I pardoned you in exchange for property," or if he says, "You pardoned the injury and what arises from it," and he says, "Rather, I pardoned it but not what arises from it," then the statement is the statement of the injured person or his guardian if the dispute is with him. This is because the default is the absence of pardon for the whole, and since a pardon for a part has been established by his admission, the statement regarding the absence of the remainder is his statement.