The woman is not guaranteed; because that is not a cause for her death (73) in the normal course of events. Our argument is that she is a human life that perished due to his sending for her, so he is liable for her, just like her fetus, or a life that perished due to his action, so he is liable for it, as if he had struck her and she died. As for his statement that it is not a cause in the normal course of events, we say: It is not so, for it is a cause for miscarriage, and miscarriage is a cause for death in the normal course of events. Furthermore, it is not required for liability that it be a customary cause, for one or two lashes with a whip is not a cause for death in the normal course of events, but whenever it leads to it, liability becomes obligatory. If a person seeks redress against a woman, and she casts her fetus, or dies from terror, the liability is upon the 'aqila (kinsmen) of the seeker of redress, if he was a wrongdoer towards her. But if she was the wrongdoer, and he brought her before the ruler, he should not be held liable; because she is the cause of her own being brought forth by her wrongdoing, so he is not liable for her, and because he was merely asserting his right, so he is not liable for what was destroyed by it, like retaliation (qisas). However, he is liable for her fetus, because it was destroyed by his action, so it is similar to if he had retaliated against her.
Section: Whoever takes another person's food or drink in a wilderness, or a place where he cannot find food or drink, and perishes due to that, or his beast of burden perishes, he is liable for what was destroyed by it, because he is the cause of his death. If he is forced to [take] food or drink belonging to another, and he requests it from him, but he denies it to him despite having a surplus in that situation, and he dies due to that, the one requested is liable; because it is narrated from Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, that he ruled accordingly, and because when one is forced to it, he becomes more entitled to it than the one in whose possession it is, and he has the right to take it by force. So, when he denies it to him, he causes his destruction by withholding what he is entitled to, so liability becomes binding upon him, as if he had taken his food and drink and he perished due to that. The apparent meaning of Ahmad's words is that the blood money is from his own wealth, because he intentionally committed an act whose likes usually kill. The Qadi said: It is upon his 'aqila, because this does not necessitate retaliation, so it is considered quasi-intentional. If he did not request it from him, he is not liable, because he did not deny it to him, and no act was found from him that caused his death. Likewise, anyone who sees a person in a place of destruction and does not rescue him, despite having the power to do so, is not liable for him, although he has acted wrongly. Abu al-Khattab said: The analogy of the first case
(73) In [B] and [M]: "ila halakiha".
لا تُضْمَنُ المرأةُ؛ لأنَّ ذلك ليس بسَبَبٍ لِهَلَاكِها (٧٣) في العادةِ. ولَنا، أنَّها نَفْسٌ هَلَكَتْ بإرْسالِه إليها، فضَمِنَها، كجَنِينِها، أو نَفْسٌ هلَكتْ بسَبَبِه، فغَرِمَها، كما لو ضَرَبَها فماتَتْ. وقولُه: إنَّه ليس بسَبَبٍ عادةً. قُلْنا: ليس كذلك، فإنَّه سَبَبٌ للإِسْقاطِ، والإِسْقاطُ سَبَبٌ للهَلَاكِ عادةً، ثم لا يتَعَيَّنُ في الضَّمانِ كونُه سَبَبًا مُعْتادًا، فإنَّ الضَّرْبةَ والضَّرْبتَيْنِ بالسَّوْطِ، ليست سَبَبًا للهلاكِ في العادةِ، ومتى أفْضَتْ إليه وجَبَ الضمانُ. وإن اسْتَعْدَى إنسانٌ على امرأةٍ، فألْقَتْ جَنِينَها، أو ماتَتْ فَزَعًا، فعلى عاقلةِ المُسْتَعْدِى الضَّمانُ، إن كان ظالِمًا لها، وإن كانت هي الظَّالمةَ، فأحْضَرَها عند الحاكمِ، فيَنْبَغِى أن لا يَضْمَنَها؛ لأنَّها سَبَبُ إحْضارِها بظُلْمِها، فلا يَضْمَنُها غيرُها، ولأنَّه اسْتَوْفَى حَقَّه، فلم يَضْمَنْ ما تَلِفَ به، كالقِصاصِ، ويَضْمَنُ جَنِينَها؛ لأنَّه تَلِفَ بفِعْلِه، فأشْبَهَ ما لو اقْتصَّ منها.
فصل: ومَنْ أخَذَ طَعامَ إنسانٍ أو شَرَابَه في بَرِّيَّةٍ، أو مكانٍ لا يَقْدِرُ فيه على طَعامٍ وشَرابٍ، فهَلَكَ بذلك، أو هَلَكَتْ بَهِيمَتُه، فعليه ضَمانُ ما تَلِفَ به؛ لأنَّه سَبَبُ هَلاكِه. وإن اضْطُرَّ إلى طَعامٍ وشَرابٍ لغيرِه، فطَلَبه منه، فمَنَعه إيَّاه مع غِنَاه عنه في تلك الحالِ، فماتَ بذلك، ضَمِنَه المطلوبُ منه؛ لما رُوِىَ عن عمرَ، رَضِىَ اللَّه عنه، أنَّه قَضَى بذلك، ولأنَّه إذا اضْطُرَّ إليه، صار أحَقَّ به ممَّن هو في يَدِه، وله أخْذُه قَهْرًا، فإذا مَنَعه إيَّاه، تَسَبَّبَ إلى إهْلاكِه بمَنْعِه ما يَسْتَحِقُّه، فلَزِمَه ضَمانُه، كما لو أخَذَ طَعامَه وشَرَابَه فهَلَكَ بذلك. وظاهرُ كلامِ أحمدَ، أنَّ الدِّيَةَ في مالِه؛ لأنَّه تَعَمَّدَ هذا الفِعْلَ الذي يَقْتُلُ مثلُه غالِبًا. وقال القاضي: تكونُ على عاقِلَتِه؛ لأنَّ هذا لا يُوجِبُ القِصاصَ، فيكونُ شِبْهَ العَمْدِ. وإن لم يَطْلُبْه منه، لم يَضْمَنْه؛ لأنَّه لم يَمْنَعْه، ولم يُوجَدْ منه فِعْلٌ تَسَبَّبَ به إلى هَلاكِه. وكذلك كلُّ مَنْ رأَى إنسانًا في مَهْلَكَةٍ، فلم يُنْجِه منها، مع قُدْرَتِه على ذلك، لم يَلْزَمْه ضَمانُه، وقد أسَاءَ. وقال أبو الخَطَّابِ: قِياسُ المسألةِ الأُولَى
(٧٣) في ب، م: "إلى هلاكها".