the necessity of his liability; because he did not rescue him from destruction despite the possibility of doing so, therefore he is liable for him, just as if he had withheld food and drink from him. Our argument is that he did not cause his death, nor was he a cause of his destruction, so he is not liable for him, just as if he had not known of his condition. The analogy of this case to the aforementioned one is incorrect; because in that case, he withheld it, a withholding that was a cause of his destruction, so he became liable for it by his action through which he transgressed. Here, he did nothing that would be a cause.
Section: Whoever strikes a person until he passes wind or defecates, Uthman, may Allah be pleased with him, ruled regarding it with one-third of the blood money (74). Ahmad said: I do not know of anything that refutes it. Ishaq also held this view. Abu Hanifa, Malik, and al-Shafi'i said: There is nothing for it; because blood money is only obligatory for the destruction of a benefit, an organ, or the removal of beauty, and there is none of that here. This is the analogy (qiyas). Those who went to the opinion of making the third obligatory did so because of the case of Uthman; because it is in a position of being well-known, and no opposition to it was reported, so it becomes a consensus (ijma'). Furthermore, the ruling of a Companion regarding something that contradicts the analogy indicates that it is a matter of tawqif (divine instruction/revelation). It is the same whether the event is wind, feces, or urine. The ruling is the same if he terrified him until he passed wind or defecated.
Section: If the killer claims that the victim was a slave, or he struck someone who was wrapped in something and he cut him, or he cast a wall upon him, or he claimed that he was already dead, and his guardian (wali) denies that, then the statement is that of the guardian, along with his oath. This is one of the two opinions of al-Shafi'i. He said in the other: The statement is that of the perpetrator; because the original state is the freedom of his liability, and what he claims is plausible, so one does not depart from certainty due to doubt. Our argument is that the original state is the life of the victim and his freedom, so it is necessary to rule by his remaining [alive/free], just as if he killed someone who was a Muslim and claimed that he had apostatized before he killed him. By this, what he mentioned is invalidated. Likewise, if he killed someone in the Abode of Islam (Dar al-Islam), and he claimed that he was an unbeliever, and his guardian denied it, the statement is that of the guardian; because the abode is an abode of Islam (75), and for this reason, we rule on the Islam of its foundling. If he severed an organ and claimed it was paralyzed, or plucked out an eye and claimed it was blind, and the guardian denies it, the statement is that of the victim; because the original state is soundness. Likewise, if he cut off a forearm and claimed that it did not have
(74) Recorded by 'Abd al-Razzaq, in: The Chapter of Whether a Man is Liable for One Who Perishes in His House, from the Book of 'Uqul (Blood Money), Al-Musannaf 10/24. And Ibn Abi Shaybah, in: The Chapter of the Man Who Strikes a Man Until He Passes Wind, from the Book of Diat (Blood Money), Al-Musannaf 9/338. (75) In [B] and [M]: "al-Islam".