commencing his oaths, and had sworn some of them, his heirs must initiate the oaths anew and cannot build upon his oaths, because the fifty [oaths] function as a single oath. Furthermore, it is not permissible to be entitled to [take anything] (10) by the oath (11) of another. This is not invalidated by the case where he swears all the oaths and then dies, because he is entitled to the property by way of inheritance from him, not by his oath. Also, (12) if the two heirs swear, each swearing twenty-five oaths, then the blood money is entitled by their oaths because they share in the oaths, and each one is entitled according to the extent of his oaths, and one is not entitled by the oath of another, even if the collection of the number is a condition for its entitlement.

Section: If he swears some of the oaths and then becomes insane, then recovers, he completes them and is not required to restart, because his oaths were performed correctly. This differs from death, for with death it becomes impossible for him to complete the oaths, and another cannot build upon his oath; whereas here, it is possible for him to complete them once he recovers. It is not invalidated by [the process being] separated over time, as evidenced by the fact that if a judge requires him to swear some of the oaths and then becomes preoccupied and pauses, it is not invalidated, and he completes them (13). What is not invalidated by separation is not invalidated by the intervention of insanity, similar to the sa'i (running) between Safa and Marwa. If he swears some of the oaths and then the judge is removed from office and another is appointed, he completes them before the second [judge], and he is not required to restart them, because the oaths were performed correctly. Likewise, if he swears some of them and then asks the judge for a delay, and he grants it, he builds upon what has passed and is not required to restart, for the reasons we have mentioned.

Section: If the oaths are returned to the defendants, and it is a case of deliberate [killing], it is not permissible [to restrict it] to more than one person, so he swears fifty oaths. If it is from non-deliberate [killing], such as accidental [killing] or quasi-deliberate, then the apparent meaning of al-Khiraqi’s statement is that there is no qasamah in this case, because a condition of qasamah is lawth (probative indication), and animosity only has an effect in deliberate killing, not in accidental [killing], for the probability of error in the enemy (14) and other than him is the same.