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حولتواصلتبرّعبيانات النشرالخصوصيةشروط الاستخدامحق الانسحابإلغاء اشتراك
المغني لابن قدامة - ت التركي
مجلد 12 · صفحة 28فصل

الترجمة · EN

Thus, it constitutes a consensus. Furthermore, the duty incumbent upon him is a value that varies according to his qualities, so the 'Aqilah does not bear it, just like other valuations. Also, he is an animal whose value of limbs the 'Aqilah does not bear, so it does not bear the duty incurred for his person, like a horse. It is for this reason that it differs from a free person.

Second Issue: That they do not bear [liability for] an intentional act, whether it is one that requires retaliation or not. There is no disagreement that they do not bear the blood money for that which requires retaliation, and the majority of scholars are of the opinion that they do not bear an intentional act under any circumstances. It was narrated from Malik that they bear [the consequences of] crimes that do not involve retaliation, such as a head wound reaching the brain (Ma'mumah) and a deep internal wound (Ja'ifah). This is the opinion of Qatadah, because it is a crime that does not involve retaliation, thus it resembles a crime of error. Our evidence is the hadith of Ibn Abbas, and because it is an intentional crime, the 'Aqilah does not bear it, just like [a crime] that entails retaliation, and the crime of a father against his son. Moreover, the 'Aqilah's bearing of liability is only established in cases of error, because the perpetrator is excused, [to provide] relief for him and consolation. One who acts intentionally is not excused, so he does not deserve relief or assistance, and thus the prerequisite for it is not present. It is for this reason that intentional acts differ from errors. Furthermore, the argument they mentioned is invalidated by a father killing his son, as there is no retaliation for it, yet the 'Aqilah does not bear it.

Section: If one executes retaliation with a poisoned blade, and it spreads to the life [resulting in death], there are two opinions regarding it. One of them is that the 'Aqilah bears it, because it is not purely intentional, thus it resembles an error in intention (shibh al-'amd). The second is that they do not bear it, because he killed him with an instrument that usually kills, thus it resembles one for whom there is no retaliation. If he appointed an agent to carry out the retaliation, then he pardoned the offender, and the agent killed him without knowing of the pardon, the Qadi said: The 'Aqilah does not bear it, because he intended to kill him. Abu al-Khattab said: The 'Aqilah bears it, because he did not intend the crime, and such [a case] is considered an error, as evidenced by one who kills a Muslim in the land of war, thinking him to be a combatant; he intended to kill him, but it is one of the two types of error. This is the more correct view. The followers of al-Shafi'i have two opinions similar to these.

Section: The intentional act of a child or a mentally incompetent person is an error that the 'Aqilah bears. Al-Shafi'i said in one of his two opinions: They do not bear it, because it is an intentional act for which they may be disciplined, so it resembles the killing by an adult. Our evidence is that full intent is not realized in them, so the 'Aqilah bears it, like quasi-intentional killing, and because it is a killing that does not entail retaliation due to the excuse, so it resembles an error and quasi-intentional killing. It is for this reason that it differs from what they mentioned, and their argument is invalidated by the [case of] quasi-intentional killing.

Third Issue: That they do not bear [liability for] a reconciliation settlement. Its meaning is that he is accused of killing, he denies it, and he reconciles with the claimant for wealth; the 'Aqilah does not bear this because it is wealth established by his reconciliation and choice, so the 'Aqilah does not bear it, just like that which is established by his confession. The Qadi said: Its meaning is that the guardians reconcile the blood of an intentional killing for blood money. The first interpretation is better, because this is intentional [killing], so it is covered by the mention of intentional killing. Among those who said that the 'Aqilah does not bear reconciliation are: Ibn Abbas, al-Zuhri, al-Sha'bi, al-Thawri, al-Layth, and al-Shafi'i. We have already mentioned the hadith of Ibn Abbas regarding it, and because if the 'Aqilah were to bear it, it would lead to him reconciling with the wealth of others and obligating a right upon them by his own word.

Fourth Issue: That they do not bear [liability for] a confession. This is that a person confesses to having committed a killing by error or quasi-intentional killing, thus blood money becomes due upon him, and the 'Aqilah does not bear it; we do not know of any disagreement regarding this. This is the opinion of Ibn Abbas, al-Sha'bi, al-Hasan, Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz, al-Zuhri, Sulayman ibn Musa, al-Thawri, Malik, al-Awza'i, al-Shafi'i, Ishaq, and the People of Opinion (Ashab al-Ra'y). We have already mentioned the hadith of Ibn Abbas regarding it, and because if it were binding upon them, it would be binding by the confession of...

الحواشي

(2) The 'waw' was dropped from [copy] B. (3) In [copy] B: "al-tahrim" (the prohibition). (4) In [copy] M: "ashbahat" (it resembled). (5) In [copy] M: "ka-al-mujib" (like that which entails). (6) Dropped from [copy] M. (7) In [copy] M: "li-anna" (because). (8) Dropped from the original and [copy] B.

السابقمجلد 12 · صفحة 28التالي
السابق12·28التالي