and he struck it with a stick he had with him, and a splinter flew off from it, hitting his eye and gouging it out. Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, assigned the blood money for it to his 'aqilah (tribe), and said: "It is a hand from among the hands of the Muslims; no aggression against anyone was committed in it." We do not know of any opposing view to him in his era. Also, because it is a crime of error, its blood money is upon his 'aqilah, just as if he had killed someone else. According to this narration, if the 'aqilah were the heirs, nothing would be obligatory, because no one is owed anything by himself. If some of them were heirs, what corresponds to their share would be dropped, and he would be liable for what exceeds his share, and he would be entitled to what remains if his share of the blood money is more than what is obligatory upon him.
The second narration is that his crime is considered void (hadar). This is the opinion of most scholars, including Rabi'ah, Malik, al-Thawri, al-Shafi'i, and the People of Reason (Ahl al-Ra'y). This is the more correct view, because 'Amir ibn al-Akwa' fought in a duel against Marhab on the day of Khaybar, and his sword returned upon him, so he died, and it has not reached us that the Prophet, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, ruled with blood money or otherwise regarding it. Had it been obligatory, the Prophet, peace and blessings of Allah be upon him, would have clarified it. Furthermore, because he committed a crime against himself, no one else is liable for it, just as in the case of intentional [crime]. Additionally, the obligation of blood money upon the 'aqilah was only for the sake of providing solace to the perpetrator and lightening the burden upon him, and there is nothing here against the perpetrator that requires assistance or solace, so there is no basis for making it obligatory. This differs from when the crime is against someone else, for if the 'aqilah did not bear it, the obligation of the blood money would be oppressive to him due to its magnitude. As for if his crime against himself is quasi-intentional, does it follow the same course as error? There are two views: One is that it is like error, because it is equivalent to it in cases where it is against someone else. The second is that the 'aqilah does not bear it, because he has no excuse, so it resembles purely intentional crime.
Section: As for the error of an Imam or judge in matters other than judgment and ijtihad, it is upon his 'aqilah without dispute, if it is of the type that the 'aqilah bears. Regarding what results from his ijtihad, there are two narrations: One is that it is also upon his 'aqilah, due to what is narrated from Umar, may Allah be pleased with him, that he sent for a woman who was mentioned for evil, and she miscarried her fetus. Umar said to Ali: "I adjure you, do not leave until you distribute it among your people." Also, because he is a perpetrator, his error is upon his 'aqilah, like anyone else. The second is that it is from the Public Treasury (Bayt al-Mal). This is the school of al-Awza'i, al-Thawri, Abu Hanifah, and Ishaq; because error is frequent in their rulings and ijtihad, and assigning the blood money to their 'aqilah would be oppressive to them. Furthermore, because he is a deputy of Allah the Exalted in His rulings and actions, the indemnity for his crime is from the wealth of Allah, Glory be to Him. Shafi'i has two opinions, corresponding to the two narrations.
1465 - Issue; he said: (And if a slave commits a crime, it is upon his master to pay the blood money for him or surrender him; if the crime is more than his value, the master is not liable for more than his value).
This refers to a crime that is compensated with wealth, either because it does not necessitate anything but wealth, or because it is a crime necessitating retaliation, but it was pardoned in exchange for wealth. The crime of a slave attaches to his person, as it cannot be that it attaches to his person, or his own liability, or the liability of the master, or that nothing is obligatory. It is not possible to invalidate it, as it is the crime of a human being, so it must be considered like the crime of a free person. Furthermore, the crime of a minor or a madman is not invalidated, despite their excuse and lack of legal responsibility, so the crime of a slave is more entitled [to this consideration]. It is not possible for it to attach to his own liability, because that would lead to its invalidation or the delaying of the right of the victim indefinitely, nor to the liability of the master, because he did not commit the crime. Thus, it is determined that it attaches to the person of the slave, and because the guarantee is an obligation of his crime, so it attaches to his person, like retaliation. Then it does not...
(29) In [copy] M: "fafaqa'at". (30) Omitted from: M. (31) We did not find it among what is in our possession. (32) Omitted from: B. The hadith was narrated by al-Bukhari, in: The Chapter on the Expedition of Khaybar, from the Book of Military Expeditions (Maghazi), and in: The Chapter on what is permissible of poetry, rhymed speech (rajaz), camel-driving songs (huda'), and what is disliked of it, from the Book of Manners (Adab), and in: The Chapter on if one kills himself by mistake, there is no blood money for him, from the Book of Blood Money (Diyat). Sahih al-Bukhari 5/166, 167, 8/42-44, 9/9. And Muslim, in: The Chapter on the Expedition of Khaybar, from the Book of Jihad. Sahih Muslim 3/1427-1430. And Abu Dawud, in: The Chapter on a man who dies by his own weapon, from the Book of Jihad. Sunan Abi Dawud 2/19, 20. And al-Nasa'i, in: The Chapter on one who fights in the way of Allah and his sword returns upon him and kills him, from the Book of Jihad. al-Mujtaba 6/26, 27. And Imam Ahmad, in: al-Musnad 4/47, 48, 51, 52. (33) In [copies] B and M: "al-jinayah".
فضَرَبه بِعَصًا كانت معه، فطارَتْ منها شَظِيَّةٌ، فأصابتْ (٢٩) عَيْنَه ففَقَأتْها (٣٠)، فجَعَلَ عمرُ، رَضِىَ اللَّه عنه، دِيَتَه على عاقِلَتِه، وقال: هي يَدٌ من أيْدِى المسلمينَ، لم يُصِبْها اعْتِداءٌ على أحدٍ (٣١). ولم نَعْرِفْ له مُخالِفًا في عَصْرِه. ولأنَّها جنايةُ خَطإٍ، فكان عَقْلُها على عاقِلَتِه، كما لو قَتَلَ غيرَه. فعلى هذه الرِّوايةِ، إن كانت العاقِلةُ الوَرَثةَ، لم يَجِبْ شيءٌ؛ لأنَّه لا يَجِبُ للإِنسانِ شيءٌ على نَفْسِه، وإن كان بعضُهم وارِثًا، سَقَطَ عنه ما يُقابِلُ نَصِيبَه، وعليه ما زاد على نَصِيبِه، وله ما بَقِىَ إن كان نَصِيبُه من الدِّيَةِ أكثرَ من الواجِبِ عليه. والرِّواية الثانية، جِنايَتُه هَدْرٌ. وهذا قولُ أكثر أهلِ العلمِ، منهم؛ رَبِيعةُ، ومالكٌ، والثَّوْرىُّ، والشافعيُّ، وأصْحابُ الرَّأْىِ. وهى أصَحُّ؛ لأنَّ عامِرَ بن الأَكْوعِ بارَزَ مَرْحَبًا يَوْمَ خَيْبَر، فرَجَعَ سَيْفُه على نَفْسِه، فمات (٣٢)، ولم يَبْلُغْنا أنَّ النَّبِىَّ -صلى اللَّه عليه وسلم- قَضَى فيه بِدِيَةٍ ولا غيرِها، ولو وجَبَتْ لبَيَّنَه النَّبِىُّ -صلى اللَّه عليه وسلم-. ولأنَّه جَنَى على نفسِه، فلم يَضْمَنْه غيرُه، كالعَمْدِ، ولأنَّ وُجُوبَ الدِّيَةِ على العاقلةِ إنَّما كان مُواساةً للجانِى، وتَخْفيفًا عنه، وليس على الجانِى ههُنا شيءٌ يَحْتاجُ إلى الإِعانةِ والمُواساةِ فيه، فلا وَجْهَ لإِيجابِه. ويُفارِقُ هذا ما إذا كانت الجِنايةُ على غيرِه، فإنَّه لو لم تَحْمِلْه العاقِلَةُ، لأَجْحَفَ به وُجُوبُ الدِّيَةِ لكَثْرَتِها. فأمَّا إن كانت جنايتُه (٣٣) على نَفْسِه شِبْهَ عَمْدٍ، فهل تَجْرِى مَجْرَى الخَطإِ؟ على وَجْهَيْن: أحدهما، هي كالخَطإِ؛ لأنَّها تُساوِيه فيما إذا كانتْ
(٢٩) في م: "ففقأت".(٣٠) سقط من: م.(٣١) لم نجده فيما بين أيدينا.(٣٢) سقط من: ب. والحديث أخرجه البخاري، في: باب غزوة خيبر، من كتاب المغازى، وفي: باب ما يجوز من الشعر والرجز والحداء وما يكره منه، من كتاب الأدب، وفي: باب إذا قتل نفسه خطأ فلا دية له، من كتاب الديات. صحيح البخاري ٥/ ١٦٦، ١٦٧، ٨/ ٤٢ - ٤٤، ٩/ ٩. ومسلم، في: باب غزوة خيبر، من كتاب الجهاد. صحيح مسلم ٣/ ١٤٢٧ - ١٧٣٠. وأبو داود، في: باب في الرجل يموت بسلاحه، من كتاب الجهاد. سنن أبي داود ٢/ ١٩، ٢٠. والنسائي، في: باب من قاتل في سبيل اللَّه فارتد عليه سيفه فقتله، من كتاب الجهاد. المجتبى ٦/ ٢٦، ٢٧. والإِمام أحمد، في: المسند ٤/ ٤٧، ٤٨، ٥١، ٥٢.(٣٣) في ب، م: "الجناية".