eat it," (4) and it is agreed upon. (5) This is a definitive text, and because what it kills with its blade is in the status of what one stabs with a spear or shoots with an arrow. And because it is sharp, piercing, and killing with its blade, while what it kills with its side only kills by its weight, it is therefore 'mawqudha' [killed by beating], like that which one hits with a stone or a pellet. (6)

A section (7): The ruling for all other hunting instruments is the same as the ruling for the mi'rad, in that if they kill with their side and do not wound, the hunt is not permissible. This includes an arrow that strikes a bird with its side and kills it, or a spear, lance, or sword that is struck with its flat side, causing death; all of that is forbidden. Similarly, if it strikes with its blade but does not wound, and it kills by its weight, it is not permissible, because of the saying of the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace): "What pierces, eat it." And because if it does not wound it, it only kills by its weight, so it is similar to that which strikes with its side.

1715 - Issue; He said: (And if he shoots at a prey and wounds it, and another shoots at it and incapacitates it, and another shoots at it and kills it, it shall not be eaten, and the one who incapacitated it is entitled to the value of it while wounded from the one who killed it.)

As for the one who wounded it but did not incapacitate it, he has no claim and no liability, because when he struck it, it was permissible, belonging to no one, and he did not establish a right to it because it remained in its wild state. As for the one who incapacitated it, he has taken ownership of it because he removed its state of wildness, so it became like holding it. Therefore, if the third person strikes it and kills it, he is liable for it because he killed an animal owned by another. This is based on the premise that the wound of the incapacitated animal is not lethal, as evidenced by his attributing the killing to the third party. He is liable for it as having been wounded by two wounds: the first wound and the second, because he killed it while both [wounds] were upon it. As for its permissibility, one must look into it; if the killer struck its slaughter point, it becomes lawful because he struck the location of slaughter, and he owes nothing except the compensation for its slaughter, as if he had slaughtered a sheep belonging to another. And if he struck other than its slaughter point, it is not lawful, because once it was incapacitated, it became within his control, and it is not lawful except by slaughtering in the throat and the base of the neck, so if he kills it by other than that, it does not