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حولتواصلتبرّعبيانات النشرالخصوصيةشروط الاستخدامحق الانسحابإلغاء اشتراك
المغني لابن قدامة - ت التركي
مجلد 13 · صفحة 284فصل

الترجمة · EN

not become lawful, just as if he had killed a sheep. This is the opinion of Abu Hanifa, Malik, al-Shafi'i, Abu Yusuf, and Muhammad.

Section: And if he shoots at a prey and incapacitates it, then another shoots at it and strikes it, the first shot does not escape two scenarios: First, that it is lethal, such as if it pierces its throat, slaughters it, or strikes its flank or heart. Then, the shot of the second is considered; if it is not lethal, it is lawful, and there is no liability on the second, unless he diminishes its value by his shot, in which case he is liable for what he diminished, because by the first shot it had become slaughtered. And if the shot of the second is lethal, the Qadi and his companions said: It is lawful, like the one before it. This is the school of al-Shafi'i. It follows from the opinion of al-Khiraqi that it would be unlawful, similar to his opinion regarding one who slaughters and reaches the vital organs, but the soul does not depart until it falls into the water or something steps on it; it shall not be eaten. The second scenario is that the wound of the first is not lethal. Then the shot of the second is considered; if it is lethal, it is forbidden, due to what we mentioned, unless it slaughtered or pierced its throat. And if it is not lethal, it has three states: First, that it was slaughtered (dhabihah) after that, in which case it is lawful. Second, it was not slaughtered until it died, in which case it is forbidden, because it died from two wounds: one permissible and one forbidden, so it became forbidden, as if it died from the wound of a Muslim and a Magian. The second is liable for its entire value because his wound is what made it forbidden, so the entire liability is upon him. Third, he was able to slaughter it but did not do so until it died; it is forbidden for two reasons: one, that he neglected its slaughter despite the possibility of doing so. Second, that it died from two wounds: one permissible and one forbidden. Liability is incumbent upon the second, and regarding its amount, there are two possibilities: First, that he is liable for all of it, like the one before it. The Qadi said: This is the opinion of al-Khiraqi, due to his imposition of liability in his issue upon the third person without distinction. However, this is not the issue of al-Khiraqi, due to his saying: "Then the third shot it and killed it." So it is necessary to interpret it such that the wound of the second was not lethal and nothing else. The second possibility is that the second is liable for the proportion of his wound, because when the first neglected the slaughter despite the possibility, his wound also became prohibitive, as evidenced by what happens if he was alone and killed the prey. Thus, the liability would be divided between them.

الحواشي

(2) In (B) and (M): "And if". (3) In (B): "so he was liable". (4) Omitted from: (M).

العربية (المصدر)

يَحِلَّ، كما لو قتَل شاةً. وهذا قولُ أبى حَنِيفَةَ، ومالِك، والشافِعِىِّ، وأبى يوسفَ، ومحمد.

فصل: وإذا (٢) رَمَى صَيْدًا فأَثْبَتَه، ثمّ رَماهُ آخَرُ فأصابَهُ، لم تخلُ رَمْيَةُ الأُوَّلِ من قِسْمَيْن؛ أحَدُهما، أَنْ تكونَ مُوحِيَةً، مثل أَنْ تَنْحَرَه، أو تَذْبَحَه، أو تَقَعَ فى خاصِرَتِه أو قلبِه، فيُنْظَرُ فى رَمْيَةِ الثانِى، فإنْ كانَتْ غيرَ مُوحِيَةٍ، فهو حَلالٌ، ولا ضَمانَ على الثانى، إلَّا أَنْ ينْقُصَه برَمْيِه شيئًا، فيضْمَنُ (٣) ما نَقَصَه؛ لأَنَّه بالرَّمْيَةِ الأُولَى صارَ مَذْبُوحًا. وإِنْ كانت رَمْيَةُ الثانِى مُوحِيَةً، فقال القاضِى وأصحابُه: يحِلُّ، كالتى قبلَها. وهو مَذْهَبُ الشافِعِىِّ. ويجىءُ على قولِ الخِرَقِىِّ أَنْ يكونَ حرامًا، كقولِه فى مَن ذَبَحَ، فأَتَى على الْمَقاتِلِ، فلم تخْرُج الرُّوحُ حَتَّى وَقعَتْ فى الماءِ، أو وَطِئَ عليها شىءٌ، لم يُؤْكَلْ. القسم الثانى، أَنْ يكونَ جَرْحُ الأَوَّلِ غيرَ مُوحٍ، فيُنْظَرُ فى رَمْيَةِ الثانِى، فإنْ كانت مُوحِيَةً، فهو مُحَرَّمٌ؛ لما ذَكَرْنا، إلَّا أَنْ تكونَ ذبحَتْه أو نَحَرَتْه، وإِنْ كانتْ غيرَ مُوحِيَةٍ، فلها ثلاثُ صُوَرٍ؛ إحْداها، أَنَّه ذُكِّىَ بعدَ ذلك، فيَحِلُّ. والثانِيَةُ، لم يُذَكَّ، حتَّى ماتَ، فإنَّه يحْرُمُ؛ لأنَّه ماتَ من جَرْحَيْنِ؛ مُبِيحٍ ومُحَرِّمٍ، فحَرُمَ، كما لو ماتَ من جَرْحِ مسلمٍ ومَجُوسِىٍّ، وعلى الثانى ضَمان جميعِه؛ لأنَّ جَرْحَه هو الذى حَرَّمَه، فكان جميعُ الضَّمانِ عليه. والثالِثَةُ، قَدَرَ على ذَكاتِه فلم يُذكِّه حتَّى ماتَ، حَرُمَ لِمَعْنيَيْن؛ أحدُهما، أنَّه تَرَكَ ذَكاتَه مع إمْكانِها. والثانى، أنَّه ماتَ من جَرْحَيْن؛ مُبِيحٍ، ومُحَرِّمٍ، ويلزمُ الثانىَ الضَّمانُ، وفى قَدْرِه احْتِمالان؛ أحدُهما، يضْمَنُ جميعَه، كالتى قبلَها. قال القاضِى: هذا قولُ الْخِرَقِىِّ؛ لإيجابِه الضَّمانَ فى مَسْأَلَتِه على الثالثِ من غير تَفرِيقٍ. وليستْ هذه مَسْأَلَةَ الخِرَقِىِّ لقوله: ثمَّ رَماه الثالِثُ فقَتَلَه. فتَعَيَّن حَمْلُها على أنَّ جَرْحَ الثانِى ما (٤) كان مُوحِيًّا لا غيرُ. الاحتمالُ الثانِى، أَنْ يضْمَنَ الثانِى بقِسْطِ جَرْحِه؛ لأنَّ الأَوَّلَ إذا ترَكَ الذَّبْحَ مع إمْكانِه، صارَ جَرْحُه حاظِرًا أيضًا، بدليلِ ما لو انْفَردَ وقَتَلَ الصيدَ، فيكونُ الضَّمانُ

الحواشي

(٢) فى ب، م: "وإن".(٣) فى ب: "فضمن".(٤) سقط من: م.

السابقمجلد 13 · صفحة 284التالي
السابق13·284التالي