the first is of no account, and the ruling regarding the two wounds of the others is as we have mentioned. According to the other method, the first destroyed a third of a life worth ten, so three and a third are incumbent upon him. The second destroyed a third of it, and its value was nine, so three are incumbent upon him. The third destroyed a third of it, and its value was eight, so two dirhams and two thirds are incumbent upon him. The total is nine, over which the ten is divided, and the share of each of them is equivalent to what he destroyed. And if they destroy a sheep owned by someone other than them, they are liable for it in the same manner.

Section: If they shoot it together and kill it, it is lawful and they both own it, because they shared in the cause of ownership and lawfulness, whether the wounds were equal or unequal, for its death was caused by both of them. If one of them inflicted a lethal wound and the other did not—nor is he considered to have incapacitated it—it belongs to the owner of the lethal wound because he is the one who incapacitated and killed it, and there is nothing upon the other because his wound occurred before the other's ownership was established over it. If one of them struck it after the other, and they found it dead, and we do not know whether it became incapacitated by the first or not, it is lawful, because the original state is that of being incapacitated (i.e., unable to flee), and it belongs to both of them because both their hands were upon it. If each one of them said, "I incapacitated it, then you killed it," it is forbidden, because they agreed upon its being prohibited (haram), and they must swear oaths regarding the liability. If they agree upon the first of them, and the first claims that he incapacitated it and then the other killed it, while the second denies the first's claim of having incapacitated it, the statement of the second is accepted, because the original state is the absence of its incapacitation, and it is forbidden for the first because of his admission of its prohibition; the statement of the second is accepted regarding the lack of incapacitation along with his oath. If the wound of each of them is known, it is examined. If it is known that the first's wound is such that incapacitation does not remain with it—such as breaking the bird's wing or the deer's leg—then the statement of the first is accepted without an oath. If it is known that it does not remove the state of incapacitation, such as a scratch on the skin, the statement of the second is accepted. And if it is susceptible to both possibilities, the statement of the second is accepted because the original state supports him, and he must take an oath, because what the first claimed is merely possible.